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I. INTRODUCTION BY GOVERNOR LAWTON CHILES
GOVERNOR CHILES: Thank you, Paul. I appreciate your kind
remarks. I’m delighted to be here this morning to participate in what
I think should be a very interesting symposium, having this number
of the members of the “dream team” and Professor Blakey here to
talk to you. And I assume that Attorney General Butterworth will be
here at some time.
Just the overview, of course, is that we won an $11.3 billion set-
tlement. We think that is a watershed moment in protecting chil-
dren’s health in Florida. What I am very pleased about in that set-
tlement is that the court specifically set aside $200 million to go for a
campaign for anti-smoking effort, earmarked especially for that. We
are busy planning how we are going to put that campaign together.
You can imagine this is kind of mind-boggling. There is to be a
two-year campaign in which to spend this money. One of the things
we know is that we have to hear from kids, so we have been bringing
them in very early—and not just acting as adults, telling them what
they ought to do—but asking them what would work with their peer
group. It is very interesting, the ideas they had. We are going to have
a kid symposium right after the first of the year that will bring in
hundreds of kids from all over the state. We are busy talking with all
of the anti-tobacco groups that are out there and trying to get ready
to initiate this program.
The genesis, I guess, of how this all came about was shortly after I
became Governor in 1991. Florida was in a slump at that time. One
of the first actions I had to take before I was actually inaugurated
was a plan that cut back all agencies a certain percent. I think we
had to actually do it twice because our revenue was not coming in.
That’s a very drastic thing when you tell somebody whatever you
thought you were going to spend, now you reduce that by a certain
amount. But, of course, when that was coming about we were asking,
“What are the reasons for all of this?”
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We found out that some of it was due to a recession. The sales tax
revenue was not coming in. But part of it was that health care costs
were just going sky-high in Florida, over twenty percent a year, way
above the rate of inflation, way above the rate of everything else. So
we asked, “What in the world is the occasion for this huge health
care cost?” Part of it was that we were on a fee-for-service, which
meant that whatever a doctor or a lab or anyone else ordered, it was
paid for in regard to Medicaid patients, which we were paying a
share of state workers’ and others’ costs. So that dictated that we had
to start moving to managed care.
But one of the other startling figures that came to light was that
we were spending over $400 million a year for smoking-related, to-
bacco-related injuries to our Medicaid recipients. Now, that’s a huge
sum of money, and especially so when you are cutting all kind of pro-
grams. We asked how in the world can we fix that, and what in the
world can we do to try to recover some of that money. And as we
looked at it, we were saying to ourselves, “Maybe the smoker has a
choice, because the smoker does elect to do something. Although if
they are addicted, you know, what kind of a free choice is that?” But
the state has no choice, because the state simply has to pay if the
injury occurs.
So that is what we faced, that the state was truly the victim. And
this behavior was promoted with advertising, promoted by the to-
bacco companies. So how can we deal with this? So we started
thinking then about trying to bring a suit against the tobacco com-
panies. As we got into that a little bit, we started seeing that the
same defense that tobacco was using against individuals, they would
attempt to try to use against the state. And we thought, that is not
fair, we ought to have a level playing field in which they should not
be able to say to us—what they said to the smoker—the warning was
on the pack in that the state did not have those kind of choices. So
that is where the idea for the Medicaid liability law came from.
That law we put together, we passed it quickly, which has gotten
a lot of attention. But the interesting thing was that after the law
passed, of course, there was a tremendous attack, and tobacco fully
came to the front. They did have some notice of the law and just
couldn’t make up their mind what to do. I will throw that in. But
then the big thing was to repeal the law. And in the next session they
were able to repeal the law overwhelmingly in both houses of the
Legislature. I, in turn, vetoed that at the end of the session.
That set the stage really, I think, for the biggest part of the fight
that I was in, and that was trying to sustain the veto of the law. I
think fifty-five lobbyists were hired. Anyone that was a cousin of
anyone or anything else was procured as a lobbyist. Tremendous
amounts of money were placed into other organized groups. The As-
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sociated Industries took the tack that the law we had, while it just
said tobacco, it was really going to get milk producers and orange
juice producers and anyone else who made a product because it was
going to hold them responsible.
We immediately said that we only were after people who sold a
product that kills you when used as directed. And that was the only
thing. But we also offered to amend the law. I issued an executive
order right away that I would only use the law against tobacco, but
they said that’s not enough, Chiles will be gone some day. So we of-
fered to amend the law. The interesting thing is the people that were
fussing about it kept us from passing the amendment to the law be-
cause they thought that might give me some ground to sustain the
veto. So they kept the amendment to the law from passing.
We then went into this protracted fight as to whether to override
the veto or not. To start with, I don’t believe that we hardly had
enough votes to count. But we decided that the one way, if we were
going to sustain this veto, it had to be something akin to the hall-
mark of my administration or anybody’s relationship with me as
Governor from the rest of my term, so to speak. And that is the basis
on which we persuaded people and pursued that.
We basically felt that the Senate was where we had to operate.
That body was smaller. There were too many House members. We
thought we would have a better chance in the Senate. So we slowly
went about trying to pick up members who would sustain the veto.
Eventually, after much consternation and fights, we were able to
sustain the veto. Actually, it never went on the board as such be-
cause it became clear that we had the votes to sustain the veto. It
was pretty dramatic at the time. But that allowed us then to go for-
ward with our suit.
Our suit was filed in 1995 to recover Medicaid dollars that were
paying for health problems attributed to tobacco-related illness, and
to protect children from falling victim to tobacco by ending the indus-
try’s fraud and callous practice of selling dangerous types of products
through Joe Camel-type marketing and advertising. So as the suit
progressed, it was originally simply a Medicaid liability suit. As in-
formation started coming out from the tobacco companies, we began
to see a lot of things they had known, and how long they had known,
and what some of their practices are, so we then amended our suit to
allege racketeering under a RICO statute and to demand punitive
damages. I think that turned out to be one of the most important
things of the suit, because the judge had ruled that we were limited
to our Medicaid damages for three years, approximately three years,
and so we could only put on the table a demand for recovery of a cer-
tain amount of damages for that. But when we were permitted to sue
740 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:737
for RICO, and for treble damages, that changed the thing tremen-
dously.
So, in effect, we were fighting on two fronts: the Legislature dur-
ing most of the time and in the courts. The lawyers, of course, were
trying to do most of the fighting in the courts. Most of the admini-
stration and our supporters were working to try to preserve the leg-
islation, which we finally did. One interesting thing is, I think maybe
you have noted, a number of the lawmakers who fought us the hard-
est when we were trying to pass the act, bring the suit, and prevent
the repeal of the act, were the first to say that when we won the suit,
“We want to spend the money for this or we want to spend the money
for that.” So the legislature is always flexible in its ability to be able
to deal with the people’s money.
Another interesting thing was, also, there was a shift in public
opinion. And I think that is why eventually we were able to sustain
the veto. People were becoming more and more informed. They were
becoming more and more upset about what tobacco was doing. And
they were paying more attention in effect to the fight that was going
on in the Legislature. It is easier if someone is giving campaign con-
tributions or other things or if your friend is asking you to do some-
thing as a public official if you don’t think that everyone is watching
or that there might be some accountability. Consequently, having the
people’s support was tremendously helpful. I don’t think we could
have sustained the veto without that. But it became clearer, and we
were trying to mass that support. We had a number of good anti-
smoking groups, a coalition against the repeal of the law that worked
very, very hard and very effectively. We certainly give them a lot of
the credit.
We were fortunate in that we had a very able judge: very disci-
plined, very studious, who paid attention to all the pleadings very
carefully.
In the meantime, of course, they did carry the Medicaid liability
law to the Florida Supreme Court. And the law was upheld in a four-
to-three opinion. So everything was close all the way through. And
that allowed us to then go back into court.
Tobacco, again in a traditional response, filed all kinds of discov-
ery motions. And as you heard about in the Cipollone court case and
others, that just wears out most people. We were fortunate in that we
had such a fine team of lawyers who I think gave as much as they got
in regard to those discovery motions. They were filing their motions
and discovery requests on tobacco, and tobacco had a huge team, but
our team was able to stay up with the motions. I also give great
credit to the Attorney General and to all of our state agencies, be-
cause people assigned to those agencies were working hours and
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hours to come up with all of the documents that the lawyers needed
so that we could stay up to date.
The judge said this case is going to be tried in a certain time.
These motions are going to be heard in a certain time. He did not
vary from any of those marks that he set down. As it became clear
that he was adhering to that, we knew we had to adhere to that, and
tobacco found out that they had to, as well. They asked for countless
delays and countless continuances. The judge just would say, “This is
the way it is going, we are going to do it.” And we were prepared at
all of those points, which did very well for us.
I would say we settled this case, as you know, just at the time we
were picking the jury. We were totally, completely ready for trial.
And that again is a tribute to our lawyers, a tribute to the prepara-
tion that they did, but that had a lot to do with forcing the settle-
ment, because it was not going to be delayed.
Outside events, because of what was going on in Washington,
helped an awfully lot in regard to the settlement that we got. It is my
judgment, and it is simply my judgment, that tobacco felt that they
had a chance of passing the tobacco liability law in this last session of
the Congress, and they felt that they had to have the Florida suit out
of the way to do that. I think they were terribly afraid that if we got a
verdict on RICO or punitive damages, this could blow everything out
of the water, because already the health advocates were saying that
what the attorneys general could come up with was not enough. They
were trying to get more on the table. But thus far, nobody was really
talking about the recovery of punitive damages or a RICO statute. So
I think that was a gamble that they did not want to take. And I think
that we had a good chance, our lawyers will tell you more about it, of
getting a verdict in those areas.
There was a part of me that wanted to see the jury come in with a
verdict. We had started this from scratch. It had been a long and
hard fight. Many, many, sleeplessness nights, many close, close calls
all the way through. In part, I wanted to see what that jury would
say about our case. And I was confident that we were going to get a
verdict. But, of course, what we had to look at was not just getting a
verdict, but also going through all of the appellate processes that we
would have to go through, before we would ever be able to see some-
thing out of the suit. And then, I began to get calls that said the to-
bacco companies were very serious, they really want to settle this
case, what is our bottom line, then we had to really come to look at
that.
I think that we took a bottom line that we thought was almost all
that we could imagine. We put in the provisions for protecting the
health of children. We put in provisions doing away with tobacco ad-
vertising on billboards. We put in a number of things that we
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couldn’t have won in the lawsuit, because we were in state court and
we couldn’t deal with many of these issues that were national. But
because again they wanted to sue, they would first say, “No, we can’t
do that.” And we said, “Okay, well, we will just go to trial.” And so fi-
nally, they called and said they were ready to settle. Part of that set-
tlement is that we told them we wanted them to be required to pay
our attorneys’ fees, and they agreed to that. So then we were looking
at this $11.3 billion, which was truly going to be able to be used by
the state, including the $200 million for the program to protect kids,
part of it for other programs. And our lawyers would be paid by the
tobacco companies, not out of the recovery by the State. And we cer-
tainly thought they should be paid.
We had entered into a contingent agreement with them to start
with. I don’t think I mentioned earlier, no one would allow the State
to put up any money for this lawsuit. So the lawyers themselves
agreed that they would fund all of the initial costs to bring this law-
suit. And so they, in effect, docked themselves and put up a large
sum of money in order to front the lawsuit. So everything that has
been said about the dream team I think is true. I think that we did
have the most skilled lawyers.
I think we were fortunate. Professor Bob Blakey from the Notre
Dame Law School is here today. You will hear about how he and Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe of the Harvard Law School came down, also, to
argue both the punitive damages and the RICO motions. They were
tremendously helpful to us in the state supreme court, in all of the
arguments that we had. And our individual lawyers, the way they
divided the case up, just did an outstanding job to do that. I certainly
thank all of our trial lawyers who were so helpful to us.
This case was never about money, as such. The case was about
trying to prevent tobacco from targeting our kids, from designing
their advertising to appeal to kids, because we know they were after
replacement customers. Tobacco kills so many people everyday, they
have to replace those lost customers. Those replacements are our
kids everyday who are being hooked on tobacco. And we knew that
we had to do something to change that.
I think that we were very fortunate in our timing that we settled
our case when we did. I’m not sure that today we could settle it. I
think that we were in a position to get a verdict, and maybe recover
under RICO or punitive damages or both. I think that could have
been a very substantial recovery. But I think under the circum-
stances the settlement was timely and a very fortunate one for us to
get.
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II.   PANEL DISCUSSION I: MYTH AND REALITY IN REMEDY AND
RESOLUTION: THE GOALS AND RATIONALE OF THE TOBACCO LAWSUIT
AND THE RELATION OF THE FLORIDA AND NATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
PROF. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL: Again, we are switching now to
the first of the panel discussions on various aspects of the tobacco
litigation. Let me quickly introduce our panelists. We are pleased to
be joined not only by the Governor, who is able to be with us for a few
minutes, but by the Attorney General of the State of Florida, Robert
A. Butterworth, who has been Attorney General since 1986.
General Butterworth is a graduate of the University of Miami
where he received his J.D. He has been involved in all aspects of the
law enforcement system, as a judge and as the Sheriff of Broward
County and as Attorney General.
Our next panelist is C. David Fonvielle, of Fonvielle Hinkle and
Lewis, and a co-chair of the symposium. David received his Bache-
lor’s Degree from the University of Florida and his J.D. from Florida
State University. David is one of our most esteemed alumni, and a
great benefactor of the law school as well. He is an accomplished pi-
lot, as well as a certified trial specialist.
The next panelist is another one of our graduates, Wayne Hogan,
who is a double Florida State graduate, receiving both his Bachelor’s
degree and his J.D. from FSU. Wayne practices law in Jacksonville
with the firm of Brown, Terrell, Hogan, Ellis, McClamma and Yegel-
wel. He is an active trial lawyer, and also a major supporter of the
Florida State University College of Law, and has given us substan-
tial support for our trial practice programs and mock trial advocacy
programs at the College of Law.
The remaining lawyer on the panel is W.C. Gentry of Jacksonville
with the firm of Gentry, Phillips and Hodak. W.C. is an accomplished
personal injury lawyer as well, and is a graduate of the University of
Florida, where he received his J.D.
We also have as a panelist this morning Professor Charles
Ehrhardt. He’s the Mason Ladd Professor of Evidence at the Florida
State University College of Law, and he is literally the man who
wrote the book on Florida evidence.1 He’s been teaching at the Col-
lege of Law for nearly thirty years.
Moderating today’s panel is Professor Lois Shepherd of the Flor-
ida State University College of Law. Professor Shepherd is a 1987
graduate of Yale Law School, and has been a member of the Florida
State faculty since 1993. With those introductions I will turn the
program over to Lois.
MR. GENTRY: Did you mention that Governor Chiles is a gradu-
ate of Florida, also?
                                                                                                                   
1. See CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE (1997).
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PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Somehow that escaped me, but thank
you for pointing that out. And Governor Chiles has graciously agreed
to be with us a few more moments. And with that I will turn it over
to Professor Shepherd.
PROFESSOR LOIS SHEPHERD: I want to first turn again to
Governor Chiles, since he only has a few minutes more to stay with
us, and ask him to tell us a little bit more about the state settlement,
and maybe in particular about some of the public health provisions in
addition to the financial positions that are in there.
GOVERNOR CHILES: Well, I would be happy to, and I will let
the Attorney General chime in on this, because I think he knows all
of the details even better than I do.
But basically, you know, in the settlement we got about $750 mil-
lion that has come in that we already have in—in escrow, in effect,
drawing $110,000 interest a day, which is very nice that it’s drawing
interest while it is sitting there. $200 million of that is ear-marked
for the children’s program, and $550 million is for health-related
costs. I think General Butterworth can describe much better some of
the language of how that was described in the settlement.
What we hope to do with that is, we have talked about children all
the way through. We want to broaden our children’s programs, our
Healthy Start, and our Healthy Families Program that we are
starting. We want to use part of these funds to be able to provide
matching money for some $200 million of federal money that is com-
ing down for increasing children’s coverage for health care. There are
a lot of similar items in the settlement. And I think with that, I will
let Bob just go a little further into those details.
Of course as I said at the outset, only because we have an attorney
general with the talent and the staff that General Butterworth has
were we able to be successful in this suit. He has lived on airplanes.
He has gone to Washington. He has been a part of the national at-
torneys general team that has put together the national settlement.
So in addition to all of the duties that he was doing in regard to the
trial, our trial, itself, he has been one of the key figures nationally. I
don’t know how he stands on land, because he flies most of the time
in all of those efforts he has made. He has been a tremendous help to
us.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: General Butterworth, would you like
to tell us more of the specifics of the settlement?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: Yes, thank you very
much. I tell you, it is hard to believe. I personally believe that Florida
played a very, very strong role getting to where we are right now na-
tionally.
As we look back, Mississippi filed the first lawsuit at about the
same time that Florida passed the legislation which allowed Florida
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in essence to be able to do what the Governor stated, to give us a
level playing field. So really Florida and Mississippi were beyond a
doubt the first two states to take the action against cigarette compa-
nies. Originally when this occurred, public opinion was really not as
strong as it is now, and especially public opinion in the legislature.
I believe, as the Governor stated, that after the veto of the legisla-
tion repealing the Medicaid Liability Act it was very difficult to sus-
tain that veto. And for a while there we thought, we might lose it in
the override. But due to the Governor’s talent at negotiation—“I’m
the Governor, you are not, I win”—I think really helped to bring this
home. If, in fact, we had not prevailed on the sustaining of the veto, I
do not believe that tobacco would be where it is right now, where
perhaps we will be having a global settlement by as early as the
middle of next year.
And remember, what we have is a situation of a threat to public
health. This is probably the number one preventable public health
problem that we have in the country. There are 400,000 people each
year in the United States who die prematurely due to smoking-
related illnesses. It is over 3,000,000 worldwide. And it has been pre-
dicted if nothing occurs within the next thirty years, it will be
12,000,000 worldwide. So this really is an issue that has affected
each and every person, at least in this country, if not most people
worldwide.
There were a number of things that worked, and the timing hap-
pened to be perfect. There were five states that filed lawsuits in the
1995 area of time. Liggett, which is owned by Bennet S. LeBow, a
Floridian, decided he wanted to settle his case because he only had
two percent of the market. By settling its case with the five states,
LeBow figured he could avoid bankruptcy. Literally one case could
bankrupt him. Also, LeBow was trying to position himself in a way to
take over RJR Reynolds. But where he came from was the fact that
he admitted that cigarette smoking caused health-related problems.
That occurred one day before the Florida Senate’s vote on the veto
override. That obviously made a difference.
Also, from the time of Florida’s lawsuit until the override, we had
more whistle-blowers from the industry say that they had been
working in the industry and they have evidence, evidence that was
suppressed mostly through attorney-client privilege, that showed
that cigarette smoking did cause illness and that nicotine was addic-
tive. As more and more witnesses and whistle-blowers came forward,
more documents were released, including the Liggett documents.
Part of our negotiation with Ben LeBow was that he would not only
make the admissions, but that he also was to give us documents, as
well as to pay each state at that time $200,000. It was not much
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money, but at least it was a token amount. We started to see a shift
in public opinion after that.
I believe that tobacco made a lot of mistakes. They were the ones
who paid more money, I believe, to politicians in campaign contribu-
tions than probably any other industry. As the Governor stated,
many lobbyists, just about every lobbyist in Tallahassee, were hired.
If you were a lobbyist not at least approached by tobacco, you must
not be a good lobbyist, because they literally hired two and three lob-
byists for each legislator.
The mistake they made was probably the mistake of just believing
that since they had bought everybody for so many decades, why can’t
we keep buying them now? Back in the 1950s when people first
started saying that cigarettes might cause illnesses, they came out
with the “frank statement,” which it was called, and they said, “We
are going to put the best scientists in the world on this. We are going
to determine once and for all whether or not smoking causes illness
or not. And of course, forty-five years later, we are still trying to de-
termine whether or not that happens. Science is still out. The scien-
tist is still out. We are not sure yet, but as soon as we find out, we
are going to tell you.”
So they attempted to intimidate the politicians. And probably the
biggest mistake they made, which actually won it all, the biggest
mistake was when they attempted to intimidate the media. We had
ABC and CBS do specials on tobacco. I believe it was ABC that did a
report on the issue of whether or not they regulate the amount of
nicotine in the product so that if, in fact, you are attempting to quit
we give you a little more nicotine and we keep you addicted. They
sued on that, and they ended up having ABC have to do, in essence,
an apology. They sued for $15 billion, I believe. But they never col-
lected the money, though, just an apology. The media does not like to
apologize, especially when it has been found out later that they were
right.
Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes was going to air a show on Dr. Jeffrey
Wigand, who was the Brown and Williamson scientist and who had a
lot of the information, and he was intimidated a lot by his former
employers, ended up teaching high school at about one-tenth of his
original salary. They told 60 Minutes, “We are going to sue you if you
air that particular program.” Mike Wallace, who is probably the most
respected commentator on TV, had to get up there and say we are not
going to be able to show what we were going to show today because
our lawyers tell us that we cannot do it. If you watched that, you
could tell it was a very troubling moment for him.
A few months later, the Wall Street Journal, taking a number of
documents off the Internet, had some front page material on what
the industry knew, when it knew it, what they were hiding. At that
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time, 60 Minutes decided they would air the piece. And they asked
three attorneys general, myself included, and Governor Chiles, to go
up there and be interviewed for a forty-minute segment. Usually it is
twenty minutes. Here it was either forty or fifty minutes. And they
dealt with the lawsuits. They dealt with Dr. Wigand at length. At
that moment, you could sense the entire public, at least the media,
was now totally against the tobacco industry and their lies. Every
time we would do anything, when we would announce anything,
there was never a negative question from the media from that day
forward. It was almost like everything was a softball question. It was
that they had attacked our own, and they intimidated our industry,
and they are going to be punished.
The second big mistake that tobacco made was after we did the
national settlement. The history of that is very simple. The President
of the United States stated to the tobacco industry that before any
legislation gets introduced, and since there are lawsuits out there, we
wish to have a number of the attorneys general sit across the table
from the industry to see whether or not, see how far they can take
the ball down the field.
And so four or five of us had the chance, starting last April, to sit
across the table from the CEOs and the general counsels and other
attorneys for the industry. The person put together to mediate it was
a former supreme court justice from North Carolina, J. Philip
Carlton. It almost sounds like a name of a cigarette, Philip and
Carlton, but he didn’t smoke though he did come from a tobacco-
growing state.
 At the first meeting, the person who started off the discussion
was former Senator George Mitchell from Maine, who stated that he
and his law firm were also to participate in helping to get this
through. The first two people we had who spoke to us, and it was a
round table or square table, and there was about maybe forty of us
around the table, was a CEO of Philip Morris, Geoffrey Bible, and
the CEO of RJR Nabisco, who was Steven Goldstone. Those two men
controlled seventy-five percent of the domestic cigarette production.
Both of them stated they wanted to make sure that when the thing
was over that their industry would be doing business differently than
it did beforehand. And they also told us, despite Joe Camel and the
Marlboro man, that the industry was not there advocating to bring
children into the fold of cigarette smokers. They never targeted chil-
dren. Joe Camel was for you and me and our parents.
The situation was that they told us just what they wanted to do.
Of course, when we attempted to sit around the table further for the
next few months, it was not quite as easy as it was that first day. It
was easy to say what they were willing to do. But when it got down
to the details it got to be very, very difficult. But at the end, we as at-
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torneys general believe it brought the ball as far down the field as it
possibly could, and we took our proposed suggestions to both Con-
gress and to the President expecting them to make it better. And so
far it is being made better.
Our goals were the same as the goals Governor Chiles stated for
Florida. The number one goal was public health, and that means the
children. The children. Almost everyone who dies a premature death
due to smoking-related illnesses started smoking before they were
the legal age to smoke of eighteen. Most of them started between
thirteen and fifteen-and-a-half. Virtually all of them. Only a few per-
centage of the people start smoking at a later age.
So we wanted to make sure we would cut down on the amount of
teenage smoking. Therefore, we had various incentives and disincen-
tives for the industry. They had to reduce within ten years teen
smoking by approximately seventy percent, which was a very, very
high number. They were not quite sure they could make it. If they
did not make it, they were subject to billions of dollars of fines for
each year that they did not make it. They would also pay billions of
dollars to each state. And in fact, each state would get the equivalent
of what that state was spending on smoking-related illnesses. For
Florida, in round numbers, let’s say $300 million a year, I think we
figured. Florida would get at least that amount of money for Medi-
caid reimbursements. The federal government also pays part of the
Medicaid costs, along with the state of Florida fifty-five percent of
our Medicaid dollar is spent by the federal government. Our share is
about $300 million. Theirs is more than that. In some states, that
federal share goes up to eighty percent, as in Mississippi. In some
states it’s lower, but the average is about fifty-seven percent.
We also worked it out where we would be requesting the federal
government to allow us to keep the federal share, which in essence
would double our money. We would also say to the federal govern-
ment you can put strings on that. The attorneys general suggested
the strings would be that we will fund the youth health programs in
all of the states. So this money would be enough to pay for universal
health care coverage for every child in each and every state through
the use of this money. Also, money would be set aside, approximately
$4 billion a year, for people in individual lawsuits to be able to sue
the industry for actual damages. Punitive damages they would not be
able to sue for.
The industry wanted certainty. The certainty they wanted was
how much money it would cost them each year. That in essence was
all they wanted. And that certainty would probably end up costing
them a couple dollars a pack extra in cigarettes over about a ten-year
period. According to the experts, a one-dollar-a-pack increase will
probably drop youth smoking by approximately thirty percent any-
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way right away, and a two-dollar-a-pack increase would probably
drop it at least fifty percent.
There would also be money for anti-smoking programs, such as
the one that Governor Chiles was just talking about with $200 mil-
lion in Florida. It would be hundreds of millions of dollars, probably
$500 million, that would be available for the federal government to
give out in grants and their own programs to stop kids from smoking.
So the whole idea was twenty-five or thirty years from now, if every-
thing went well, the way it was supposed to, in essence there would
be no more smoking in the United States. It would no longer be a
problem.
We delivered our package to the President and the Congress, as I
stated. The President has given his views on it, and he has expanded
on it in order to give the Food and Drug Administration more juris-
diction, and also to make sure that the kids’ programs were high-
lighted, and perhaps that there would be no tax deduction for any
type of penalties that they would incur. Under present law penalties
are tax deductible for every other industry. This one would be differ-
ent. They also wanted more for public health communities, which
was fine.
The big mistake, and this was the second big mistake, not the big-
gest mistake that tobacco made, a number of months back they
slipped through a $50 billion tax exemption for themselves when the
Congress had passed, I believe, a fifteen cent-per-pack increase in
taxes. What they ended up doing was to take that away, by saying in
an amendment—no one knows where it came from, but it just hap-
pened—that they would get a credit against a global settlement for
that $50 billion. Right there tobacco lost all credibility with every-
body, including Congress, throughout the country.
What Florida also wanted was the truth about the product. So did
we at the national level. Adults can smoke legally, but they should be
able to have all the information available before they make that par-
ticular decision to smoke.
As we were coming close to closure in Florida, I agree with Gover-
nor Chiles, we were very, very fortunate. We had a very, very, very
good judge. This judge every single day we were in court, he would
say to Wayne Hogan, David Fonvielle, and W.C. Gentry, “We are
going to trial on August the 4th.” This might have been a year and a
half out. “We are going to trial on August the 4th, 1997.” And the to-
bacco companies said, “Sure, Judge, forget it, that’s not going to hap-
pen.” We might have two or three lawyers on our side of the table.
They probably had sixty lawyers on their side of the table each and
every day.
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“Well,” he said, “don’t tell me you don’t have enough lawyers, be-
cause you’ve got them.” They had enough. We had enough. That was
it. “You are going to trial.” He kept doing it and doing it and doing it.
And the main persons in charge of our preliminary motions were
Wayne Hogan and W.C. Gentry and Andy Berly.2 We were ready, as
the Governor stated, and we were there and we were winning our
motions. David Fonvielle was doing most of the discovery, and
probably at one point in time he had 100 lawyers working with him
up here in Tallahassee handling all of the depositions and discovery.
Tobacco has told us they thought they were going to break our back
on the discovery and the depositions. It didn’t happen. It just didn’t
happen.
So Florida was the battleground. Before any settlement, the Gov-
ernor made sure that the kids’ issue was taken care of, and it was.
He also stated that he wanted admissions. In fact, before he went to
the table to talk with them, he said, “I want some token of good
faith.” They killed Joe Camel the first day of our negotiations, proba-
bly about six weeks before we actually resolved the case. Coming to
the table RJR announced that Joe Camel would no longer be used.
They killed off Joe Camel.
We also wanted them to make sure all documents came out in our
case, every single document that has been sprung free for trial will
become public. Some of them are still in the Fourth District Court of
Appeal. They should be out fairly shortly. So when these come out,
these thousands of documents come out, they can be used by any
other state or any other individual suing in the country.
We also wanted admissions. The tobacco companies said, “Okay,
we are probably going to settle this case. You have two of our CEOs,
Goldstone and Bible, set for deposition in Palm Beach. We want
those depositions postponed.”
The comment they got from me was “Forget it, you deposed the
Governor,” which they had. “We are deposing your CEOs. Talk about
settlement afterwards.”
“What should we tell our CEOs to say?”
I said, “Well, why don’t you tell them to tell the truth?”
They said, “But we always tell our CEOs to tell the truth.”
I said, “Well, you should probably say it again.”
The first CEO deposed was Geoffrey Bible, of Phillip Morris. In
that deposition he was asked a number of questions. I will para-
phrase here:
Question: Do you believe it is possible that cigarette smoking
might have caused the death of one person?
                                                                                                                   
2. J. Anderson Berly, Esq. of the law firm or Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson &
Poole, Charleston, S.C., who formally was introduced as part of the second panel. See infra
Part II.
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Answer: Yes, that’s possible.
Question: A hundred people?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Thousands?
Answer: Yes.
Deposition over.
Goldstone, RJR CEO, was deposed the next day. That went na-
tional, all over the world, CNN, all over.
Goldstone: Well, I’m fairly new to the business, only about three
years. And I believe, yes, that smoking can and probably does cause
illness.
Another question: Do you believe that a person who chooses to
smoke should have access to all information?
Answer: Yes. If there is anything that we have that shows that
smoking is harmful to your health or nicotine addictive, that should
be in the public domain. Everybody should have all the information
before they make the decision whether to use a product. It is our re-
sponsibility if the product is not safe to let people know that.
Those were pretty strong admissions from tobacco CEOs all com-
ing here into Florida. The Florida trial team brought this issue home,
really not only for Florida—a tremendous victory, the largest ever in
the world—but also I personally believe for the country. And that na-
tional settlement will be, we believe, sometime towards March or
June of 1998.
These lawyers that we are talking about now were in the pits, lit-
erally fighting and battling against odds that were, back in 1994 and
1995, the odds—anyone who would have signed up to work on this
case for the State should probably be in a psychiatric hospital. That’s
what people really thought. Because at that point in time the
chances of winning, no one ever had. Did you have a legislature be-
hind you? No. How did the law get passed? Some people said we did
it the way tobacco does. Maybe we did. But the thing is it got done.
This is what happened. These are the results. And the Legislature
also passed a legislation appropriations bill saying that no dollar, no
State of Florida dollar, can be used to fight the tobacco industry.
The supreme court eventually thought that was not appropriate,
but at least that was the law when these gentlemen—the trial law-
yers—signed on with the State of Florida. They have done I believe
very Herculean work in bringing this to where it is. I believe it is a
tremendous accomplishment for the State of Florida, but also for eve-
rybody that worked on it.
And I cannot find one legislator of the 160 who did not know what
they were voting on back in 1994. They all wanted the law to pass. I
cannot find one legislator who knew they were voting to not allow the
State to use any public money on this. I cannot find one legislator
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who does not believe that the State did the right thing now. It is
amazing how selective memory works. And what is very interesting,
the same tobacco lobbyists that were working against us, now, in ac-
cordance with the settlement agreement, are to work with the State
of Florida in lobbying for laws and regulations that will accomplish
the reduction of youth smoking. So those 100 and some-odd lobbyists
who were working for tobacco may still be working for tobacco, but
they will be doing it in conjunction with the State of Florida to reduce
teen smoking. So we think it is a total victory.
But the people that really did the work, a lot of people that really
did the work will have an opportunity to talk about it.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: Let me ask you to explain, if you
would, what happens if the national settlement does pass? How will
that affect what Florida has agreed to?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: Our settlement
agreement is that, if the national settlement passes, if it is substan-
tially the same as Florida’s, the national agreement will prevail. The
numbers that Florida will get in dollars, besides the $750 million we
have, if the national passes, we will get an additional $250 million
upon the national passing, which is $1 billion in the first year. If it
passes, Florida will also get an additional approximately $220 mil-
lion, which is Florida’s share of about five and a half percent of the
national money that will be there for states. And that will be gradu-
ated, starting off right around the $4 to $4.5 billion range, up to
about five years to an $8 billion range. Florida gets five and a half
percent of that. So theoretically, if Florida gets its first payment in
September, Florida will get anywhere between $1 billion and $1.2
billion in the first year. And then in the fourth year it would be over
$400 million a year, whether or not the global settlement passes. If
the global settlement does not pass, Florida gets these monies. So we
think Florida is in a win-win position.
Now, Senator Bob Graham just last week introduced legislation to
allow the State of Florida to keep the other half of the money, so if
the global settlement passes we probably will get $440 million a year
versus the $220 million.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: If the national settlement passes, will
there be other provisions that will alter how the Florida settlement
will be run? I was wondering about the documents. You said, for ex-
ample, all the documents that have been disclosed in this trial are
going to be public. Will that also be the case if the national—
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: A number of us have
been asking the Congress to hold tight to get documents out. I don’t
think we need the 12,000,000 documents that are theoretically
floating around, because I’m sure hundreds and hundreds of them
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are duplicates and the same as the rest. But in our case here, W.C.,
how many documents did you break out in this case?
MR. GENTRY: We only have about, what, 200, Andy, left?
MR. BERLY: That are still left.
MR. GENTRY: We have about 200 Tobacco Institute documents
that are in the Fourth District right now. That brief is due from us in
the next week or two.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: How many have you
broken out? 
MR. BERLY: Oh, thousands upon thousands.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: We have broken out
probably thousands after the Florida settlement. So even when you
add it up, a lot of what we have out is what Congress has been ask-
ing for. So we believe that Congress will have most of the things they
want pretty much from the Florida case. But they should still ask for
more and more documents, because the more you have, the more his-
tory you have about the industry. They are not really complaining
about these documents coming out. They are pretty much in agree-
ment.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: For years the Council for Tobacco Re-
search was conducting these experiments, for example, or trying to
get out information about smoking, suggesting that it wasn’t harm-
ful, or that the evidence was not conclusive. What is going to happen?
Will that continue?
MR. GENTRY: The Center for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco
Institute are to be effectively disbanded under the agreement. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: Right. That nexus was
really the whole crime, fraud, that allowed us to free up the docu-
ments that were hidden. And in fact, the documents that Andy was
so successful in getting, and which are part of our settlement agree-
ment we are still free to get, are approximately 200 Tobacco Institute
(TI) documents that appeared to be child targeted documents. We’ve
never seen them. They were subject to privilege law. We were able to
get them through the crime/fraud exception to the privilege and they
have taken a petition for cert. to the Fourth District. And so we are
really kind of excited to see those 200 TI documents which appear to
be child-target documents.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: Can you explain, Andy, what the
work of the CTR [Council for Tobacco Research] and the TI was that
has produced these documents?
MR. BERLY: Well, supposedly CTR was established in the early
‘50s. I think General Butterworth mentioned the “frank statement.”
The tobacco industry ran an ad called “frank statement” in all papers
throughout the country where there was a circulation greater than
about 50,000. And they said we are going to set up the Tobacco In-
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formation Research Center. They changed the name later to the
CTR. We are going to honestly and independently research whether
or not tobacco causes disease. And whatever we find out, we are go-
ing to tell you, the public, because we believe, quote, health is para-
mount. We’re going to cooperate with the public health authorities,
we’ll cooperate with the government. These are the things we are
going to do in CTR.
Well, the truth of the matter is that CTR was nothing but a pub-
lic-relations front. It was a sham. Several courts have found that. It’s
been found in connection with the crime/fraud hearings. What the
industry really used CTR for was as sort of an insurance policy. One
of the documents I have today sort of speaks to it. The idea was that
the industry could have this trade organization, but they told the
public it was really independent. It really was controlled by tobacco
industry lawyers. If they could point to the CTR and say we are going
to independently research it and we are spending $5, $10, $15, $20
million a year, that was their cheapest insurance that money could
buy because they could then look at the public and say why would we
spend $10, $20 million a year researching this if we weren’t sincere
about it. Of course, they are spending $6 billion a year advertising, so
their priorities are a bit skewed. But that’s really what the CTR was
doing.
TI was their non-scientific organization. That was their public
relations arm. And they were purely and simply an open and avowed
public relations entity. Their theme was that on smoking, there was
a controversy. That there was doubt as to whether or not smoking
caused disease, notwithstanding every major medical association in
the free world saying it did. Their view was there was a controversy
and there was a doubt. So that’s the way those two work together.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: One other thing about the national
settlement, if you could speak to it. There has been some criticism of
the proposed national settlement, which I guess is the way we should
be talking about it. For example, with respect to the elimination of
punitive damages’ availability to individual plaintiffs, and the elimi-
nation of class action suits, could you speak to that?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: Sure. Our goal was to
bring the ball as far down the field as we possibly could. And as you
are sitting as a lawyer across the table from the other side, you
pretty much do the best job you can.
We believe the biggest mistake we made, we took the ball too far
down the field, and we gave very little room for the President and for
Congress to really move within and put their name on the settle-
ment. The whole idea was that once we did our thing, we were sup-
posed to walk away, and then let the real politicians do their thing.
And maybe that’s the mistake we made. We took it down to the fif-
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teen-yard line, we should have taken it down maybe to the forty-yard
line.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: So you think some of the criticism is
because there is not much credit left for shaping it?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: That’s one of the
problems we really have. The class action issue, I was always of the
feeling that the judicial branch is not going to allow the executive or
the legislative branch to tell them how to run their courtroom, espe-
cially if they want to consolidate a few cases.
On the punitive damages issue, we believe that the amount of
money that the industry was paying up front and everything were, in
essence, their punitive damages. Punitive damages are not to be
given theoretically to the individual, but are to be given to society at
large to prevent defendants from doing this behavior in the future.
You’re not really out there to give a windfall to a victim, you are out
there to prevent them from doing something in the future. And we
believe that by having FDA be able to really stop them from selling
cigarettes at a point in time, to force them to have to do a safe ciga-
rette or an alternative nicotine delivery device, all that money was
probably punitive enough. I believe that at the end of the day, on the
punitive damages issue, Congress will probably agree with that.
So on the actual cases, and how many you can consolidate, I be-
lieve there is a little bit of room there for Congress to allow some
cases to be tried together.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: Perhaps some of the private attorneys
who were involved can tell us how closely you believe the ultimate
settlement matches what you were seeking in the beginning.
MR. HOGAN: Maybe another way to approach that would be to
add one additional factor that was insisted on by the Governor and
the Attorney General related to the Florida settlement. That is that
in the event that there is not a passage of a national proposal that
includes a substantial number of equitable remedies, injunctive
remedies that are sought there, that our injunctive count still stays
in force here in Florida.
More to that point, Judge Cohen, who the Governor and the Gen-
eral have both pointed out has consistently from the day he walked
in and introduced himself to us, he said, “Hello, I’m Judge Hal
Cohen, and your trial date is August 1, 1997.” And he stuck to that
and reminded us every step of the way as the General indicated.
In this Florida settlement, the court has retained jurisdiction over
the equity count. He has gone ahead and set a trial in September of
next year. In the event of a failure of the national proposal, we will
be back in trial with the industry to seek additional relief beyond the
elimination of the billboards, and beyond the requirement that
vending machines be placed only in adult locations, and beyond the
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other obligations that the industry now has to assist in passing fur-
ther regulations related to minors. Included in that is the demand
that the Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research be
ordered dissolved. That aspect is still a part of what Florida has the
ability to seek; in addition to that, orders that the industry disclose,
disseminate, and publish all of its research.
In other words, we would be asking the judge to require that in
the event the federal statute does not require that, that they produce
all of these documents that relate to smoking and health. That it en-
join—that Judge Cohen enjoin—them from engaging in any form of
consumer fraud in violation of Florida laws. And it covers a wide
range of their agents. These are the demands in the complaint. That
they fund a corrective public education campaign relating to the is-
sue of smoking and health. And so that would mean regardless of
what they agreed to already, Judge Cohen would be permitted to
consider these additional steps, to order that they take all necessary
steps to prevent the distribution and sale of cigarettes to minors, and
that they fund clinical smoking cessation programs. And finally, a
demand, although it may be subject to their debate with us, that they
disgorge their profits. They may have a contention about whether
that has been resolved thus far.
Those are the kinds of things that we are seeking in terms of the
public health in the equity case. Much of that will be in the national
proposal if it passes as negotiated by General Butterworth and the
other attorneys general. But failing that, they will be available to us
through our group in the trial.
MR. GENTRY: Professor, I think, because I’m not sure one fully
appreciates what an extraordinary settlement it was, it really is at-
tributed to the Attorney General and to Governor Chiles, who stood
in there and insisted that the equity piece be in, taking the billboards
away and the rest, and insisted we be free to go back to court, which
as you know is unheard of. They pay us, but yet we still get to sue
them if we don’t like what happens in the national settlement. To put
it in context, the court had ruled, probably properly so, contrary to
my argument, that we could not recover future damages under the
act, thereby limiting us to, as far as the Medicaid recovery goes, by
our estimate approximately $1.2 billion.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: That would be from 1994 to the date
of trial?
MR. GENTRY: July 1, 1994, up to the date of the jury verdict, and
by estimate approximately $1.2 billion. We would have had to have
come back every couple of years and do this all over again. We really
were enjoying it, but we were pleased that we were not going to have
to come back.
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So we were limited on the past damages. The remainder of the
damages we recovered would be primarily treble damages if we were
successful in RICO, and we sure we were with Professor Blakey on
board, and/or disgorgement on the equity counts, and punitives. But
we were limited in our punitives to fraud under Chapter 817. The
judge had stricken all of our other theories of punitives, believing
that we were limited to the Medicaid act.
So the settlement, which has a present value, I’m not quite sure
what, but probably in the range of at least $6 billion, settles those fu-
ture claims that we were going to have to come back time and time
again to get as well as the other potential claims. So it is an excep-
tional settlement. In some ways, one could argue it gave us more
than we could realistically expect to accomplish in this lawsuit. So it
was really exceptional, and was a tribute to Governor Chiles and the
Attorney General that they hung in there and really made them pay
an extraordinary premium to the State of Florida.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: We had some references to the Medi-
caid Third-Party Liability Act. Can someone explain what that was
about and how central that was to the lawsuit?
MR. HOGAN: Let me start by drawing an analogy that relates, I
think, to this whole topic. Medicaid is a program that pays based on
the person who receives the benefits, whether they be direct or
whether they are payments for medical expenses, if that person falls
under a particular category related to their poverty, and in that
sense, operates as a welfare program. Where the state, all states who
participate in that program, and they all now do, are obligated to pay
regardless of what the person may have done to put themselves in
that situation, or however it is that they find themselves in need. The
state is then in the circumstance where it has expended these mon-
ies, and properly entitled in an individual case or in broader context
the way the statute is set up, to be reimbursed for the amount of
money that has been expended.
It is not unique to the subject of tort law and tortious injury. For
example, in the situation in which there is a non-supporting parent,
sometimes referred to, generally, if it is a male, as a deadbeat dad.
You have a situation in which the State of Florida through Medicaid
is obligated to pay expenses for the rearing of and other expenses
that otherwise would be paid by the non-supporting parent. The law
has been for a long period of time that regardless of whatever equi-
ties that father might have, he is denied visitation or a variety of
other things, it does not change the fact that the State of Florida and
the taxpayers had been obligated to fund the costs involved. And so
regardless of what defenses he might be able to raise, if it were the
mother who was pursuing the benefits, they don’t apply to the tax-
payers’ claim.
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The very same concept applies under the Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act dealing with tortfeasors. In that setting, regardless of
what role the smoker may have had, and whether or not the smoker
chose, didn’t choose, knew, didn’t know, regardless of that, the state
was in the position where it was obligated to pay. We have all the
proof that we need that the industry wanted as many people as they
could conceivably get to smoke to be smoking cigarettes, and they
didn’t care one bit what kind of expenses were incurred by the tax-
payers.
So this set of Medicaid statutes provides, and a key aspect of it is,
that regardless of what the equities might be, so far as contentions
that the cigarette industry might make in an individual suit by a
cigarette smoker, when the taxpayers are demanding their money
back, they are not subject to any of the defenses or the contentions or
the arguments that might have been made if the smoker were the
one bringing the lawsuit. So the concept is not a revolution of the
law. It is really a continuation of what the rules have been all along,
and the industry knew it. The cigarette industry knew it. In fact,
there are documents demonstrating that they were aware of the
availability of these programs to pay for the health care costs. In
many ways, then, the proper argument can be made that they de-
cided to take a ride on the taxpayers’ backs.
And so this 1994 statute, which has received all the notoriety, I
would tell you that it really is the determination of the Governor,
without regard specifically to the 1994 statute, that made this thing
happen. The reason I say that, W.C. and I were working on the briefs
in defense of the constitutionality of the statute. W.C. made a major
point of seeing to it that we included this argument on the constitu-
tionality. The Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act received its name
not in 1994, but in 1990, when a major revision, twelve columns of
statutory law, was passed and specifically said that it was intended
to eliminate any equities that there might be in a third party, and to
ensure that the State of Florida was the payor of last resort. A whole
series of changes were placed into the law in 1990. We argued in the
briefs that that statute in and of itself could have been used by the
State of Florida to be able to pursue claims against the cigarette in-
dustry.
It is the case, though, that Governor Chiles when he came in saw
the problem. And he saw the problem and felt that it needed some
very specific kinds of remedies. The supreme court decision3 that
Justice Overton authored made note of the fact that the 1994 statute
expanded and clarified the fact that there would be no affirmative de-
                                                                                                                   
3. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239 (Fla. 1996).
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fenses. Not that it said for the very first time that there would be no
defenses, but that it clarified it and expanded it specifically to say
that there was no comparative negligence, no assumption of the risk.
And a variety of other changes that were included in the statute
or were at issue were these, in addition to the issue of the affirmative
defenses, that there was a provision that the State would not be re-
quired in the lawsuit to identify the individual recipients. During the
course of today, we will get into the discussion as to whether it was
necessary to have included that provision and the effects that it had
during the course of the litigation.
There was a reference that the statute of repose, which is a con-
cept in products liability that cuts off a claim regardless of whether it
was known to exist or not, there was a provision that that would be
abrogated. I know something about that general topic through his-
tory, and there is a question as to whether that particular aspect
needed to be placed into the statute, but nevertheless it was. A provi-
sion that all of the State’s claims could be presented in one proceed-
ing; that is, the idea that the State is receiving each Medicaid claim,
each bill paid in essence would be a claim. The statute specifically
said that all of those can be brought in one proceeding. We can dis-
cuss again whether that was necessary as an element of the statute
or whether that is already provided for by the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
One of the specific items that it added was the idea that we could
use market share against this industry because of the idea that peo-
ple would use different brands over the years and that carries back
over ten, twenty, thirty, forty years, because this is a latent dis-
ease-causing product. We were allowed to use market share in con-
junction with joint and several liability, which was a problem. A part
of the statute that the court had a problem with said you could use
market share, but at the same time a defendant would be responsible
for the whole. That was one of the issues.
Finally, a provision said that we could prove up causation and our
damages, the expenses that the State incurred, and the fact that they
were caused by cigarette smoking, by use of statistical analysis.
So those are the six major statements that were made in the 1994
statute that were subject to attack when the declaratory judgment
action was filed here in Tallahassee. Judge Steinmeyer ruled on
those. Some of his findings found for the industry; some for the State.
Then those issues went up to the supreme court resulting in the deci-
sion that Governor Chiles mentioned earlier on a four-to-three basis,
hinging on a single vote in the supreme court on that issue.
One important thing to know about that is that on this issue, is
this something that is going to be used against someone or some in-
dustry besides the cigarette industry?
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PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: That’s one of our questions.
MR. HOGAN: Well, one aspect of that is to know that although it
was a four-to-three decision, it was a three-to-one-to-three decision.
There was a concurring opinion by Justice Wells, who made it very
plain that from his standpoint he did not see a set of circumstances
out there that would make this particular statute applicable, where
no defenses are usable, et cetera, against any other industry, but for
the kind of record that he had the impression that we were able to
build against the cigarette industry. It is a unique product. It kills,
as the Governor said, when used as intended. And it has not any
other benefit, no benefit whatsoever, except to feed a created addic-
tion.
So that opinion upholding the statute also provides protection for
other industries which are not in that kind of a situation. And all of
us would hope that there are no other industries who want to be or
are in the position of producing useless products that are promoted
so heavily simply to get the profit by killing people.
MR. GENTRY: Let me just, on that point, make another point.
And that is the genesis of the Act was the federal legislation which
mandates that every state shall, if it is economically feasible, under-
take to recoup these expenditures from a liable third party. So there
is a mandate in federal government that the state do these things.
The 1990 statute was, in fact, probably the broadest statute of any
state and still is, without the 1994 amendment. So it was pursuant to
the federal mandate that the State of Florida enacted this legislation
to allow it to proceed to recover from the third parties.
It would not be economically feasible in my view, at least, for the
state to even think about proceeding against another industry. Peo-
ple do not appreciate the fact, and Andy probably has the statistics
down a lot better than I do, but the morbidity, health problems,
death caused by alcohol, elicit drugs and just about any other cate-
gory of product that you can think of is only a small percentage of
that caused by tobacco.
Given the enormous hurdles that we had to prove damages
through epidemiology and statistics in this case, where candidly we
were only going to be able to recover $300 to $400 million a year at
best, when we knew it was probably more like a billion, but in terms
of what we could prove, we were going to be probably limited to $300
or $400 million, it would be totally infeasible for you to bring this
sort of action against, say, the alcohol industry or some other indus-
try. It just would not be practical.
So one, the statute wasn’t designed to do it. And secondly, it just
would not be practical. As Wayne said, the supreme court has made
it very clear that it is probably not going to uphold it anyway.
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PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: We have one more question that has
been asked from the audience that we will go ahead and take the
time to answer before we break.
This is a question for the Attorney General. It reads, “This lawsuit
was supposed to have been brought to offset the cost of Medicaid for
the State of Florida. Are we going to see a tax break or cuts since a
large portion of this burden is now going to be shouldered by the set-
tlement?”
ATTORNEY GENERAL BUTTERWORTH: The legislature is the
one who will appropriate the money. I would assume, as the Gover-
nor stated, and I believe it is the intent of Congress, that this money
be used to deal with health. And probably, since the industry has fo-
cused its attention on getting children addicted, it is the best thing to
use it for children’s health issues.
So we believe what this will be doing will be to save the state
money in the long run, from not having to pay other money out for
certain type of medical issues. But it is up to the legislature how they
want to do it. We know that $200 million will be spent on prevention
programs, probably scholarship programs.
The rest of the money can literally be spent by the legislature any
way they want. That is up to the legislature. But I just hope they
would go along with the settlement, and also I think Congress, and
use this for health.
MR. FONVIELLE: Let me point out, too, that this is a long-range
program; that the money you are seeing come in, as opposed to per-
haps looking at it as offsetting taxes or some other expense today,
this is going to offset our entire future. If we can eliminate the
smoking or if we can decrease it by ninety percent, then we are going
to have so much less cost that we probably wouldn’t have to increase
taxes in the future or we definitely wouldn’t as much as we would
have.
And at the same time, remember tobacco has spent decades cre-
ating this monster out there that is self-perpetuating and running
the cost up to the state. As the Governor pointed out to us early on in
the case before we even signed on, and as he told you today, he didn’t
say it in this many words, but what should be obvious is if the to-
bacco disease issue went unchecked, it was going to break us sooner
or later.
So don’t look for—I don’t know, because I’m not involved in the
legislature. The lawyers haven’t been involved in the politics, which
would be whether or not you reduce taxes. But I wouldn’t expect it to
reduce it right now, because I would want every dime spent to save
our future; that is, to eliminate the smoking problem in the long run.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD: Thank you.
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III.   PANEL DISCUSSION II: THE DYNAMICS OF VICTORY: THE ROLE OF
THE REMEDIAL STATE LEGISLATION, RICO CLAIMS, AND SMOKING
GUNS
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Now we can begin our second panel dis-
cussion of the morning. Let me formally introduce two new members
of the panel who informally joined the prior panel.
To my far right is J. Anderson Berly. Andy Berly is a partner in
the law firm of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, of
Charleston, South Carolina. His Bachelor’s degree is from Clemson,
and his J.D. from Wake Forest. He is an experienced trial attorney
who began his career with the U. S. Department of Justice Torts
branch before entering private practice. We are thrilled that he could
be with us today.
On my far left is Professor G. Robert Blakey of Notre Dame. Pro-
fessor Blakey has a long association with Notre Dame having ob-
tained his Bachelor’s from Notre Dame, as well as his J.D. He also
worked in the Department of Justice, not surprisingly I think you
will find, in the racketeering section at the beginning of his career.
From 1969 to 1972, he was chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee on Criminal Law and Procedure where he was involved
very much in the gestation of the Racketeering Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, better known as RICO. Professor Blakey is
widely reputed to be the primary drafter of the federal RICO statute,
as well as the primary drafter of Florida’s version of RICO, as well as
approximately twenty-six other state versions of RICO. After his
time in Washington making dramatic new law, although behind the
scenes, he was a professor of law at Cornell University and then re-
turned to Notre Dame in 1981, where he holds the William and Doro-
thy O’Neill chair.
With that I’m going to turn the program over to Professor Jean
Sternlight. She is a graduate of Harvard Law School. Her bachelor’s
degree is from Swarthmore College. She’s been a member of our FSU
College of Law faculty since 1992. Professor Sternlight is an author-
ity on civil procedure and alternative dispute resolution, and writes
frequently in these areas. With that I will turn the program over to
Jean.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Thank you. This specific panel is
entitled “The Dynamics of Victory: The Role of the Remedial State
Legislation, RICO Claims, and Smoking Guns.” What we are going to
do in this panel is really talk about the strategic aspects of this liti-
gation, basically from the lawyer’s perspective, how did the case
work, what did work, what didn’t work. We will also spend some time
on the particular issues of the statute, the RICO claims, and as well
the smoking gun documents of the case.
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I thought what we would do first is just have the various panelists
up here identify themselves quickly, not just their names, but also
their own particular role in the litigation. Maybe if we can start with
you, Mr. Berly.
MR. BERLY: I’m Andy Berly. I am with the Ness, Motley firm in
Charleston, South Carolina. We have a number of clients like Florida
that have sued the tobacco industry. As such, we sort of serve as na-
tional counsel on medical, scientific, and liability issues. We are the
ones who have a pretty good cache of internal industry documents
obtained in large part here in Florida, but also in other litigation that
we are involved in.
And one of my principal roles was to make sure that we pursue
the proper documents that we were aware of that needed to be had,
and to run them through a procedure that Mr. Gentry in large part
set up in Florida called the “deemed produced” procedure so we could
get access to these documents to be used in the Florida case.
MR. FONVIELLE: I’m David Fonvielle of Fonvielle, Hinkle &
Lewis here in Tallahassee. My primary responsibility in the case was
defending the discovery efforts of tobacco in Tallahassee. Basically
that was the extent of my involvement in the case.
MR. HOGAN: I’m Wayne Hogan with Brown, Terrell, Hogan,
Ellis, McClamma & Yegelwel in Jacksonville. Most of my work is
plaintiffs’ personal injury work. Over the years a substantial part of
that has been asbestos disease. Some of that work has been in asso-
ciation with Andy Berly’s firm, Ness, Motley.
It happened that one day I attended a meeting of the trial team,
at which I said, “Well, what’s going on with this declaratory judg-
ment action where they are attempting to attack the constitutional-
ity of the statute?” And somebody said to me, “Well, I don’t know,
why don’t you find out?”
So early on I managed to get myself “Tom Sawyered” into the
business of helping to defend the constitutionality of the statute. I
had the privilege of arguing to support the constitutionality in the
trial court here in Tallahassee, along with Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jim Peters, a person whose name hasn’t been mentioned until
now, today, but whose name should be mentioned often and glow-
ingly for the tremendous work he did during the course of this case in
a wide sphere of involvement, along with Professor Laurence Tribe
from Harvard, who also defended the constitutionality of the statute.
I had the additional duties over time in the case of tending to the
elimination or contesting of the affirmative defenses, a variety of sets
of affirmative defenses that were presented by the cigarette industry
defendants in this case.
And then I was smart enough to Tom Sawyer W.C. Gentry into
additional work on the defense of the constitutionality of the statute.
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Once he got knee deep into it, he decided to jump in up to his neck
and over. And, W.C., maybe you can supplement your role in the
case?
MR. GENTRY: I’m W.C. Gentry, Gentry, Phillips & Hodak in
Jacksonville. I’m just a North Florida lawyer. I nominated Wayne
Hogan to find out what was happening in the Tallahassee court on
the declaratory judgment decree. Then he nominated me to help
write the briefs for the Florida Supreme Court. Wayne and I and Su-
san Nial from Andy Berly’s firm, who is a brilliant woman and a
huge asset to us, wrote the briefs to the Florida Supreme Court,
which ultimately turned out to be successful.
Then, as a result of our having rather intimate knowledge of the
statute at that stage, we took on responsibility, Wayne and I princi-
pally throughout the case, to handle all of the legal issues, and had a
great opportunity to work with Andy, whom I had never met before,
and really one of the most extraordinary lawyers I’ve ever known.
Andy would fly down to West Palm Beach throughout all the discov-
ery disputes. I guess you must have made about seven trips down to
Judge Rutter. I would hold his bag and listen to his arguments, and
every now and then say, “Florida law does provide for that, Your
Honor,” and helped Andy with discovery.
So we were kind of coordinating all the activities in West Palm,
while David Fonvielle, who kind of diminished his role, but worked
here in Tallahassee where there were millions of documents pro-
duced. There were literally troops of defense lawyers stomping
around Tallahassee for over a year. There were hundreds of deposi-
tions taken; and there was the constant problem of trying to work the
bureaucracy here in Tallahassee and keep it in line. David com-
pletely oversaw all of that, as well as also assisting, with working out
our Medicaid damages. So our role was more in West Palm Beach on
the affirmative front, while David’s was more on the defensive front.
PROFESSOR EHRHARDT: I’m Chuck Ehrhardt, a teacher at the
FSU Law School. I had a minor role, and that was to consult on some
evidence issues. Perhaps my major role in all this was I was privi-
leged to teach David and Wayne torts when they started here, and
was also privileged to serve as a faculty member with Bob Blakey
when he was here at the law school as a member of our faculty a few
years ago.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: I’m Bob Blakey. I got involved in this
case when they called me one day and said, “Can you do this with
RICO?” And my answer was, “No, you probably can’t.”
He says, “No, no, you don’t understand. We are doing it. The ques-
tion is can we do it.”
I said, “Well, if you put it that way, yeah, you can do it. You could
do it this way and do it that way.”
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And then they said, “Well, now that you’ve gotten us into this, can
you come down and defend your handiwork?” So, I came down and
worked with Wayne and W.C.
It actually sounded like we knew what we were doing. I was con-
stantly amazed. Every day we would go in court and there would be
all this material there, and I would stand up and hear them arguing
and they would convince me. Fortunately, we convinced Judge Cohen
that this case really was more a Medicaid Third-Party Liability case,
which is what it started out to be. As the evidence developed it
turned out to be that they weren’t just selling a defective product.
They were selling a defective product knowing it was defective and
lying when they were doing it.
So a case that started out to be just “reimburse us for the injury,”
turned out to be basically a racketeering case. By that I mean a fraud
case, a fundamental fraud case, and the judge saw it. It was fasci-
nating to watch the evidence change, and the direction of the case
change as the evidence changed. And the law, it looked a different
way as it went down. I’m inclined to think that the outcome of the
case was as much a RICO result, which incidentally I don’t think it
started out that way, but it changed that way.
The final posture of it—you would have to talk to the people who
actually did the settlement—but my impression was that a major
reason for the settlement was the fact that this was a racketeering
case now based on the evidence, rather than simply a medical cost
reimbursement case based on the injury. I credit that, not so much to
myself for drafting it, but for people like Andy getting the documents
out, just to demonstrate it. I had no idea how bad it was, and no idea
how intimately involved in the fraud the lawyers were.
As I began seeing it, I was just awestruck myself that an industry
would turn and be one thing one day and become another thing an-
other, and that a major role would be played in that by lawyers. I
must say that having worked with organized crime all my life, I’ve
never seen anything comparable to that. A lot of people talk about
organized crime and the racketeering angle: that was designed for
the Mafia. And I said, “Yeah, that’s true. But when you look at how
these people acted, they acted like they were members of the Mafia.”
If you figure 450,000 people killed every year, intentionally killed
every year, the mob doesn’t do that. These people acted like the mob.
I’m glad that a statute drafted for the mob held them up to that legal
standard.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Thank you. In the previous panel
we spent some time talking about the Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act.4 I think it was you, Mr. Hogan, who went through a list of the
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six features of the statute. I have them written down. You can correct
me if I missed any, but you talked about how the statute: (1) abol-
ished affirmative defenses that the tobacco companies might con-
ceivably otherwise have had; (2) allowed for proof of damages
through statistics; (3) eliminated certain statute of repose defenses;
(4) allowed for proof of market share and joint and several liability;
(5) allowed all the companies to be sued together in one lawsuit; (6)
allowed that a lawsuit could be brought without identifying the indi-
vidual recipients of the individual medical treatments.
What I wanted to do now, and perhaps you can start us off,
Wayne, is to have you explain from a litigation standpoint which of
those provisions were really significant and why, and perhaps were
there some as you alluded to earlier that were not actually all that
significant.
MR. HOGAN: To talk about the ones that were not essential, and
get them out of the way to begin with, the statute of repose had been
repealed in 1986. And so it was unclear to us how it occurred that the
1994 statute would have a provision that said that a statute that had
been repealed in 1986 was going to be abrogated in 1994. It created
some problems for us in the case, because when you go about the
business of abrogating something that already is off the books, then
somebody gets the idea on the defense side that, well, now we’ve got
an argument here. All we have to do is attack the new abrogation.
So, part of the sets of motions that we dealt with near the end of the
case had to do with whether the claims were barred by the long-
repealed statute of repose. Judge Cohen ruled that the claims for
product liability were not barred because of the latent disease excep-
tion that exists with regard to statute of repose, but he did apply it to
the issue of fraud.
Just let me make a little segue here if I can. During the course of
the case, W.C., when we were in the midst of drafting an amendment
to the complaint, determined that we should also assert Florida
statutory causes of action: unfair and deceptive trade practices, tar-
geting of minors, sales to minors, and false and misleading fraudu-
lent advertising. W.C. can cover this in more detail. The short ver-
sion of it is, though, that the one that survived as a free-standing
count of the complaint was our count four; it provided for recovery for
false advertising, and it’s a broad definition of the Florida statute.
But the judge applied the statute of repose to cut that off as of
1982, so far as the basis for liability, although we were committed to
putting in earlier acts of the companies to show the state of mind of
the companies, their intentionality. So the statute of repose was
placed at issue when perhaps it would not have been an issue at all.
Another one was the aspect of the statute that provided for all the
claims to be brought in one proceeding. That was much contested
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over time and over the course of the litigation in the Florida Supreme
Court. But in reality, in the end, the supreme court said, “Well, that’s
what you do under Rule 1.110-G of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure anyway. A single plaintiff with multiple claims is permitted to
join them together.” So that was also not something that was needed
in the legislation, but was placed there.
There was another provision that the rules of evidence and other,
substantive rules were to be liberally construed. The supreme court
said, “Well, thank you very much, legislature, for telling us that. We
are going to follow the ordinary rules that we have here in Florida for
that. We understand that that’s predicatory language that says what
you would like for us to do. We will follow the rules in the way they
should be followed.”
The court said the very same thing on the issue of the use of sta-
tistics to prove up causation and damages. In the end, the court said
that we see that in the statute, but it doesn’t mean anything other
than you are going to follow the appropriate rules of evidence with
regard to the use of statistics, both the causation and damages.
So those several areas of the statute were the source of a lot of
discussion and debate and lawyering, but in the end were not the
keys. The first key provision was the continuation of the concept of
eliminating the affirmative defenses, which were abrogated. That
was an important factor, whether it was 1990 or whether it was
1994, because that said what was between the smoker and the ciga-
rette industry does not come to haunt or visit the state in its Medi-
caid reimbursement lawsuit. That’s between them, that’s an ar-
rangement that they got into some way, somehow, but is not some-
thing that should reduce the State’s recovery.
The supreme court in the opinion upholding the constitutionality
of the statute said that this is a new cause of action for the state, and
under those circumstances, new causes of action may or may not de-
pending upon the will of the legislature, carry with them what are
traditionally thought to be defenses that might be available to any
given defendant. In this instance, the supreme court, dealing with a
significant tremendously burdensome public health problem, was en-
titled to abrogate those affirmative defenses or not allow them to ap-
ply. Then the other key provision is the concept of market share.
Florida law provides for market share in an appropriate setting
through the Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.5 decision that Justice Ehrlich
wrote some years ago. But in this instance the Legislature specifi-
cally said you can use that concept and you can use it with joint and
several liability. Eventually the supreme court said, “Yes, you can
use market share, but you cannot use it to provide for several liabil-
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ity as well where there would be joint and several liability for the de-
fendant.”
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Market share: that’s just the con-
cept that a company can be held liable simply based on how many
cigarettes they sold, that they would be held liable for that much
damage?
MR. HOGAN: What their proportion of the market would be. And
those are the six basic concepts. It might be well for W.C., if you
would, to address the way that the market share issue was resolved
and applied in the case.
MR. GENTRY: Well, that’s kind of interrelated with a couple of
things. One thing that Wayne didn’t mention, that was a real thorn
in our side, was the one provision that provided that discovery or
identification of individual Medicaid recipients would not be permit-
ted—a totally gratuitous provision which became a tremendous
weapon. The court found that by not allowing any identification of
Medicaid recipients, the statute was unconstitutional because it ar-
guably denied due process to the tobacco companies. We only devoted
maybe a half page in our brief to it. We thought it was a discovery is-
sue. It was superfluous.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: What is that issue, just whether or
not you would have to disclose the names of the individuals who had
placed Medicaid claims against the state?
MR. GENTRY: Exactly. The problem is that there are already lots
of statutes on the books that prohibit public disclosure of Medicaid
recipient information, so a lot of information was going to have to be
kept privileged. But the idea that the defendants would not be able to
get any information about Medicaid recipients when we are suing
them for arguably billions of dollars of Medicaid dollars on its face
was unconstitutional—or arguably was unconstitutional. And it was
just not necessary. They took the court’s finding that this determina-
tion that it couldn’t be discovered as being unconstitutional as an af-
firmative statement by the court that they had the right to discover
it.
So much of our effort was spent fighting with the tobacco compa-
nies, who were trying to use that to argue that they were entitled to
go house by house and depose every Medicaid recipient, which means
we would get to trial sometime in the year 3000. Ultimately, the
judge had to fashion some way to deal with this language in his deci-
sion. He allowed them representative discovery. We got into a lot of
tactics there. We were presenting our case by statistical analysis. We
kept taking the position that their remedy was to get a statistically
valid sampling. They didn’t want to get a valid sampling because
they knew if they got it, it would prove our case. And they were
really using this as a way to get us off track. So one thing David Fon-
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vielle did repeatedly in discovery here in Tallahassee was to keep
throwing back at them, “We’ve given you all this stuff, we’ve given
you all this stuff, when are you ever going to get around to discover-
ing what you should be discovering?” So that by the time, they came
around saying, “Okay, now that we wasted nine months chasing all
these rabbits, now we want to get a valid statistical analysis.” The
judge said, “Tough luck, guys. You blew your opportunity.”
But that was a big problem for us, and candidly again, although
the 1994 amendments were primarily helpful, I mean if you really
had to focus on it, the one most helpful thing was the abrogation of
affirmative defenses.
And whereas the 1990 act arguably, I think pretty strongly we
could have argued, abrogated defenses they would have had against
the Medicaid recipient, the ‘94 amendment was so broad that it
clearly abrogated all defenses. So we were able to argue that it abro-
gated the defenses against the state. They were attempting to put in
issues regarding whether there should have been more regulation of
the industry, whether or not the state was, itself, at fault for not do-
ing more about the smoking by children, and those sort of issues.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: These arguments were in the form
of counterclaims?
MR. GENTRY: More in the nature of comparative fault through
assumption of risk. We were able to successfully convince Judge
Cohen that the 1994 Act had, in fact, abrogated those. They were not
going to be defenses to Professor Blakey’s RICO count. We were able
to press all those defenses over into equity, and they were preserved
in equity on the argument that they could be used to show the State
had unclean hands. We may hear more about that if we go back to
trial.
On market share, I was really pleased with the way we handled
market share. In fact, in the supreme court, we basically acknowl-
edged that we couldn’t have market share and joint and several li-
ability. That’s about really the only thing we lost, and we acknowl-
edged that. What we did on market share, at the close of the case as
we went forward with a number of affirmative motions, we filed a
motion to preclude any evidence that the State had manufactured
cigarettes, which it did. We learned much to our shock that the State
had manufactured cigarettes back about fifteen, twenty years ago.
Part of our logic in discovery, poor David, we elected not to copy
the documents tobacco was copying because they were copying mil-
lions of them, and just the copying of them in an effort to keep track
of them would have totally bogged us down. Plus, they were getting
stuff through public records and through the libraries, and we had no
idea what they were getting. So we made the tactical decision not to
770 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:737
copy documents they were copying from our files. In part we said,
“After all, how bad can it be?”
Well, we learned how bad it can be, because every time we would
have a hearing they would have a press conference pulling out docu-
ments from our files, and some of the documents showed that we
made cigarettes. So we filed a motion towards the end to preclude
any evidence of our making of cigarettes as not being relevant to the
issues, and arguably would only be relevant to the equity count.
They, of course, came in and argued strenuously that of course it was
important to market share. It should not have been important to
market share because they should have only been liable for their
share of market, and so it shouldn’t matter that there’s some other
share that goes unaccounted for.
So we then, once they made their argument, said, “Fine, we will
stipulate on behalf of the State of Florida, that we will be liable for
our share of the market for the greatest number of cigarettes we ever
manufactured, without the necessity of proving that what we manu-
factured back in 1980 has anything to do with 1997. We will stipulate
to that, that the geographic market of the State of Florida, the
population is the general population. You get the benefit of all the
cigarettes we ever manufactured. Your Honor, that should be some-
thing to be taken care of post-trial, and you will set off the verdict
and give each one of them a pro rata benefit of our market share.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: And that was all to try to keep
those documents away from the jury?
MR. GENTRY: Yes, and it worked. The judge said, “Well, that
makes—that seems eminently fair and reasonable to me. The State
stipulated to this—the maximum market share even though you
don’t have to prove causation, and it’s certainly something we can do
post-trial. We will deduct pro rata the State’s market share.” Of
course, the State’s market share was probably 0.2 percent, but it took
all of that evidence out.
So that was one of the kind of fun things that we did tactically as
we went through the case. We learned that if we asked for some-
thing, they would always oppose it. So we candidly on more than one
occasion would ask for something we really didn’t want so they would
oppose it and then we could get what we wanted to get. But market
share was one of those that worked out that way.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: I wonder if one of you could talk a
little bit about the drafting of the complaint. When I read the com-
plaint that I had, which is one of the amended complaints, I thought,
“Well, that’s a very impressive document and it’s got all these great
RICO claims and everything else.” I gather from talking to some of
you there is a little bit of history to the complaint itself.
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MR. GENTRY: Well, Mr. Berly’s firm, I think, actually drafted the
original claim. Just basically the original complaint was drafted with
multiple counts, and was similar I think to the Mississippi com-
plaints. But, Andy, you guys were the ones who put that together.
MR. BERLY: Right, it basically started out in our office and went
through several drafts and amendments and revisions. I’m not sure
how the last one came to be. It did start out originally in our office
based on literally piles of documents that we had that had been
sorted through so you could see what the industry knew, when they
knew it, what they did or what they didn’t do about it. It was based
largely on Mississippi, which we thought at the time was probably a
good idea. It later turned out to be not the best of ideas because of
different statutes and different things here. But Wayne Hogan fixed
most of what we messed up in our office. It went through several
drafts.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: What were some of the real strate-
gic things you had to figure out in filing a complaint, such as which
county you decided to file in, and who you decided to name as the de-
fendants? Were those some of the issues, or were there other issues
that were more important?
MR. HOGAN: Well, the members of the industry, the key mem-
bers of the industry, were named. And so there is no mystery to that,
including any that were manufacturing cigarettes in Florida. And it
turned out that was also the case. And so, no magic to that. That is
the industry.
The complaint, itself, began as an eighteen-count complaint. It
had a variety of common law counts in addition to the two statutory
causes of action. Fraud, unjust enrichment, restitution, an injunctive
count, which was the count eighteen, the last count in the complaint.
In the end, when the judge first considered the question of the mo-
tions to dismiss, he focused on the fact that the supreme court had
upheld this new statutory cause of action, as the court termed it,
which allowed it, and the supreme court said, negligence and strict
liability, causation and damages.
And it was in that instance when Judge Cohen, in a decision that
was going to be really the guide for how the rest of the case was go-
ing to go, read this very strictly, read it very literally, and said, “This
is what the supreme court says you can do, and that is, what you are
going to do, and that is you are going to have a negligence count, you
will have a strict liability count, under this statute.”
And he then dismissed the other common law counts, except for
the independent free-standing count for injunctive relief, which
would go to his equity jurisdiction.
And so we went from an eighteen-count complaint to a three-count
complaint. Of course, there was the usual industry crowing and press
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conference, all because they said this gutted the case, to which the
Governor said, the court’s ruling protects the heart of our case and
we are going forward. We knew that at some point under Florida
procedure you can’t seek punitive damages in the complaint initially
except under a statutory count, for example, as we did eventually in
count four. But we knew that eventually we were going to move the
court for permission to add punitive damages to the case, and so that
was holding to the side. We knew that, but Judge Cohen didn’t know
that.
So at some point for case management purposes, Judge Cohen
asked whether there were going to be any further amendments to
this complaint now that you are down to three, and we went through
all the processes of evaluating where we were. If we could look back
at our fraud count, and look back at everything else that we had said
previously, can we take that together and knowing what we know,
what name would you apply to that? Well, you would apply fraud
statutorily, and you would apply racketeering to it. So out of that
case management aspect of the case the complaint then re-expanded
to an eight-count complaint that included four counts for racketeer-
ing and one count for fraud, false advertising, child targeting, and
the unfair and deceptive trade practices.
MR. GENTRY: Professor, Wayne gives much too sterile an expla-
nation on this.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Juice it up for us.
MR. GENTRY: We were absolutely apoplectic when the judge
struck all our counts. We had fraud in there, and we knew we had a
great case for punitives. Candidly, I think he was wrong. I mean the
statute says that we may bring any cause of action but he took a very
literalist view of the statute, which later served us in some cases, but
it was literal. It was an untested statute, and he basically said I will
read it literally. I am going to apply it that way to everybody. It was
fair, it was uniform, but it was literal. In fact, we talked about
whether we could take an appeal. My God, what are we going to do?
All we’ve got is negligence and strict liability. We don’t have fraud
anymore. We don’t have any of this stuff.
Then he basically said, “Would you like to amend?” and we said
“Yes, we would like to amend; how can we amend?” Someone came
up with the idea of RICO, I think it really was the attorney general’s
office, which has more experience with RICO than obviously we do as
civil lawyers.
They called Professor Blakey. He says, “No, I don’t think so.” We
said, “Yes, there must be.” And out of, you know, out of necessity
came really a resentment. As Bob has said, I think that RICO then
became a very, very important engine to the case. It allowed us again
to get into the corruption and into potential exemplary damages.
1998]                         TOBACCO SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT 773
The judge did permit us to do this. His view was you had to have
statutory causes of action, so he permitted the Medicaid cause of ac-
tion which allowed negligence and defect. He permitted Florida stat-
ute 817.41, which is the misleading advertising statute, which is very
broad, the Deceptive Practices Act. Then he permitted RICO. So we
were back in the game again, and we had the same evidence and we
had pretty much the same remedies. It’s just that they just had a
new name. But I can tell you there was a lot of consternation that
went on before we got there.
Then Professor Blakey can tell you all the difficulties we had with
RICO, which he largely surmounted. Before he does that, I just want
to say it is really wonderful to have him sitting there when the de-
fendants bring some hotshot down from Washington to talk about
how RICO does not permit this sort of cause of action, and have Pro-
fessor Blakey explain that, “Well, maybe the federal RICO doesn’t,
but the reason why I wrote the Florida statute the way I did was to
take care of this problem.”
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: By the way, Professor Blakey also
wrote the federal statute and about ten million books and articles
about RICO.
MR. GENTRY: He admitted that he made a couple of mistakes in
the federal statute. It was the only time I heard him admit he made a
mistake. He actually didn’t make a mistake, they misconstrued it.
Am I stating it more accurately?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: No. Now that I’m working in Texas to
cover RICO I would like to indicate there were no mistakes in the
federal statute.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Tell us a little bit, Professor Blakey,
about just what it was that RICO added.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Let me kind of talk about the statute as a
whole and where it came from and how it is applicable in the situa-
tion. The RICO statute was enacted by Congress in 1970. I was
working for Senator John McClellan at the time, and the Mafia
really was the core that the statute was aimed at. But it was the oc-
casion for its enactment; it didn’t define the scope.
The operative language in the statute is “any person.” When peo-
ple say, “Well, does that mean Mafia only?” I always ask, “What part
of ‘any’ don’t you understand?”
What happened after that is that a number of states picked it up.
In 1977 I worked with Senator Edgar Dunn down here and the state
passed the statute. It was a little more sophisticated in Florida be-
cause there were some things identified between 1970 and 1977 that
needed to be cleaned up, and did clean them up here in Florida. But
you probably need to think about this if you want to understand the
application of the statute. Take on the one hand the Mafia here, and
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the Mafia is distributing heroin in the ghetto. The way that heroin is
used is with a syringe. So you say, how can that statute be designed
to apply to that, how can it apply to the tobacco industry?
It is not that difficult. All you have to do is say instead of a trade
association for people called the Mafia, which is all the Mafia is, a
trade association for gangsters, here suddenly we have a trade asso-
ciation for cigarette manufacturers, and instead of having a syringe
that gives you heroin in your veins, suddenly we have a cigarette.
You shouldn’t think of it as a piece of paper wrapping up tobacco.
What you should think of is the delivery system for nicotine, which is
all it is.
It doesn’t really go for taste to your tongue. What it does is it puts
nicotine to your brain, puts it right in your blood and takes it right to
your brain. Actually puts it into your lung and takes it to your brain.
So if you suddenly think of it that way, here is a trade association for
gangsters or in this case a trade association for tobacco people, a sy-
ringe and a cigarette. Then you look at the end product here, it’s
450,000 people dying every year. This product is lethal and addictive.
What started out as an action for really a defective product, as
soon as you find out that the defective product is defective or addic-
tive and lethal, and that it’s being distributed and marketed in the
community by targeting it at children . . . let me stop and drop a
footnote. While we call drug pushers “drug pushers,” in fact, drug
pushers don’t push drugs on anybody. People go find them.
The notion that some guy is working near the school selling drugs
to kids is simply not true, but it happens to be true when you deal
with the tobacco industry. They, in fact, are targeting and pushing
drugs on kids. One of the reasons they do that is that adults don’t
smoke, in other words, take up smoking. You have about a million
people a year who are newly addicted and the vast majority of them
are children and they then stay addicted.
One of the medical facts is that it is easier to break the addiction
for heroin than it is for nicotine. Once you begin thinking of it in
those terms, all of a sudden the application of a racketeering statute
to the tobacco industry becomes . . . yes, because one of the things we
learned in 1970 was that organized crime had found a way to develop
fronts in the legitimate industry and continue their activity hidden
behind fronts. And suddenly, my God, the tobacco industry is really a
front for drug dealers. It is just not the same drug you’ve always
thought about, cocaine or heroin. Now it is nicotine. If you think of it
in those terms and you apply the statute to it, what does RICO do for
you? Well, it does a lot of really neat things.
The first thing it does on liability is that RICO is a criminal stat-
ute, and you can apply it either on the criminal or the civil side, like
antitrust or like securities or like food and drug. But because it is a
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criminal statute, it doesn’t have civil defenses. One of the ways in
which the tobacco industry had beaten cases all the way down the
line is what I like to call “the mini-skirt defense.” This is what is put
in in a rape case, “Because she is wearing a mini skirt she deserves
it.” What they wanted to do was try not their own conduct, they
wanted to try the conduct of the victim, the smoker.
Well, none of those kinds of defenses—assumption of the risk,
comparative negligence, consent—are defenses in a criminal case. So
if RICO is the standard of liability, albeit in a civil context, none of
the standard defenses are there. That gives you a neat standard for
liability.
The underlying predicate offense or the underlying crime that you
have to show in RICO in this case is called federally “a scheme to de-
fraud.” Now, a scheme to defraud is not what everybody learned it
was at common law. Remember the definition from Prosser, a mis-
representation and justifiable reliance? That is what you think of
when you think of fraud.
That’s not what it is in RICO. What it is in RICO and federal mail
fraud jurisprudence, which the Legislature here adopted for Florida,
for these purposes is called the “Gregory” standard. It is conduct in-
consistent with morality, fairness, in the general business life of the
community. It is not limited to misrepresentation. It includes cheat-
ing and overreaching. When you turn and look at what the tobacco
industry had done, selling cigarettes to children which is illegal and
has been illegal in fifty states since time immemorial, and lying
about it, that is exactly what the behavior is. So that gives you a good
standard of liability. It then gives you different sets of remedies. Un-
der the state statute you can sue either for equitable remedies or le-
gal remedies.
Let me talk about legal for a minute. One of the problems you
have in traditional common law remedies is you have to show a
wrong, proximate cause, and then injury, and then typically from the
injury you get actual damages. Well, RICO gives you treble damages
plus counsel fees. So that is great on that end. When you have to
worry about a proximate cause relationship between liability and
injury, the way in which this is conceptualized in common law, you
had to have a justifiable reliance, in a fraud.
Well, if you don’t have to have misrepresentation, you don’t have
to have justifiable reliance. All you need is a proximate cause rela-
tionship between the activity and the injury, not necessarily reliance.
So what they were prepared to argue is that there was no proxi-
mate cause, which was that the smokers were not justified in be-
lieving what we told them. That takes hubris to make that argument,
but that’s exactly what they were saying. Our argument was, wait a
second. There are two ways in which you can have causation. One
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through the misrepresentation, but second simply through the pro-
duction of the product. So by having mail fraud rather than common
law fraud we got out of justifiable reliance.
They came along and said, well, you have to have common law
proximate causation. That also means direct and indirect injury. The
direct person can recover, but the indirect couldn’t. For example, if
you take over a business, the business can complain, but the employ-
ees can’t. If you injure a county, the county can complain, but the
taxpayers can’t. So in this situation they said, “Well, the directly in-
jured parties are the smokers; the state can’t complain.”
Well, one of the neat things that RICO does for you is it says, it
asks on the question of proximate cause, what’s the target of the
scheme? If the target of the scheme is only aimed at the smokers, it
was a good argument. But Andy Berly kept coming up with docu-
ments after documents that showed that the original target of the
industry was not just the smokers, it was the people who paid for it,
meaning us. If you stop and think about how they were doing it, it
makes good sense. They want to sell it to kids. They have to sell it at
a low cost to sell it to kids. What they were doing is building in as
part of the product the overall cost of the product. If I made widgets
and my widgets hurt a certain number of people, I would have to
build into the cost of the product the cost of the sale of the widgets,
and then I would spread it through the whole community.
What they were able to do is lower the cost of the cigarettes in the
first instance to catch people and kids to buy them. If I’m getting my
economics right, their demand for cigarettes is elastic. As price goes
up, they will buy less. Once they are addicted, their demand for ciga-
rettes is inelastic. So they have to keep the cost of the cigarettes
down in the first instance. That means they have to shift the cost of
the product out of the product.
And they did exactly that. They said, “We will have the state, the
taxpayers, pay the cost of the medical cost or damages associated
with this product.” That is in their documents. Because that’s in
their documents, their scheme targeted not just the smokers, but us,
too. RICO has a flexible understanding of targeting in mail fraud
that I think is probably broader than a common law standard. So this
gives us higher damages, treble damages, higher counsel fees. It
gives us a flexible proximate cause with no direct or indirect injury in
it. And it gives us the business of not worrying about justifiable reli-
ance.
But RICO does more than that. And one of the neatest things that
it does is when the state brings a suit, it doesn’t merely have to think
about money out of its own pocket. One of the remedies available un-
der federal RICO, and therefore under state RICO, is disgorgement.
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Disgorgement is not measured by money out of my pocket, it is
measured by money into your pocket.
And once we came down and started arguing it, W.C. said, “Well,
if that is in there, why don’t you say something about that in the
course of the argument?” So I started mentioning disgorgement every
time I got up in court. Judge Cohen was very, very perceptive. As
soon as I said it, you could see his eyes light up. He understood ex-
actly what I said. The tobacco folks didn’t for a while.
And then one day they showed up, they understood it, and they
made a motion to strike our request for disgorgement, because they
suddenly realized that the measure of our damages were not limited,
not limited, by proximate cause or direct or indirect, that was not our
injury, it was their profits. They suddenly realized that we could turn
them through this suit into a non-profit industry. And then the ques-
tion would be, how big would that pie be. One night I made a mis-
take. And they are all going to start laughing.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Second mistake, oh, no.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: No, I made a mistake. We were all sitting
around one night, and the issue came up, how big could our recovery
be? How big? And I said, well, the damages are over here, and there
is a range of what you can get in disgorgement. At a minimum it
would have been their net profits from sales to children in Florida.
That’s the minimum. The maximum would be their gross profits from
sales worldwide.
Well, one guy just jumped up, he jumped down. I don’t think he
ever stopped bouncing. All he would remember is the one thing that I
said. Worldwide gross profits. He would never focus on net profits for
children in Florida. They suddenly realized how powerful this was, it
had no problems with proximate cause. Incidentally, you could get
both. You could get the damages out of our pockets and all the profits
in their pockets. One would be tried by clear and convincing evidence
to the jury, that is the damages.
But the equity relief is going to be preponderance of the evidence
to the judge. I think the judge had the good judgment to overrule the
issue on disgorgement and it remained in the statute, and it was
shortly thereafter that we settled. So I think what RICO did for us is
it had the effect of dramatically changing the scope of the damage
remedy. It had the effect of dramatically changing the nature of the
nexus between the wrong and that injury. It had the effect of dra-
matically increasing the possibility of disgorgement, and having a
sound statutory basis for it.
We had a common law disgorgement count in, but common law
disgorgement sometimes is tied to a showing of loss on your part.
Statutory disgorgement under RICO is not limited at all by any loss
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on your part. It changed the scope of the definition of liability, and
incidentally let in just enormous amounts of evidence.
I haven’t told you the best thing it did for you. It changed the
statute of limitations. RICO went through here in the State of Flor-
ida in 1977. This little thing they were playing around over here was
1990 or 1994. Suddenly the damage remedy went from 1994 back to
1977. They jumped up and said, “Oh, no, no, you can’t do that,” and
they cited the federal statute, which has a four-year statute of limita-
tions, in which the Supreme Court had just decided that it was a
moving statute of limitations. The only problem with that is in 1970
there was no statute of limitations put in the federal act. That was a
mistake. In 1977, we put, Senator Dunn put a statute of limitations
in the state statute. We made it a continuing one, expressly a con-
tinuing one, which meant that if any period of activity was within the
statute, all activity was within the statute.
And it is the same statute for the criminal side as it is for the civil
side. The state courts had clarified if any part of criminal activity is
in, all criminal activity is in. So here we had a clean statute of limita-
tions, authoritatively interpreted by the courts. We had a possibility
of disgorgement. All of their profits from where we were back to
1970. We had our damages back.
The largest problem we had on damages is, I went to Wayne and
W.C. and other people that were working on it, that we can’t prove
damages back that far. We don’t have the evidence back to 1977. So
we were in a position of having a greater period of ability to recover
the damages than we had evidence for. In other words, we had too
much damages. We couldn’t prove it all.
Now, the disgorgement we could have proved. All we had to do
was go get their annual reports. They had already told the SEC what
their profits were. Our theory was, “You made money?” “Yes.” You
made it illegally?” “Yes.” “You made X?” “Yes.” “Give it to us.” It
wasn’t going to be that complicated. So everybody thinks that what-
ever he works on is the one that is the biggest story. I’m sure that’s
not the case. But I do think that what RICO did slowly has dramati-
cally changed the character of the entire litigation. It wasn’t just
third-party Medicaid reimbursement anymore. It was a racketeering
case against the industry.
Had we won in Florida after a verdict here, the Third-Party Medi-
caid Liability Act would have had no impact on any other state. But
there are twenty-seven other state RICO statutes. Most of them in-
corporate the federal mail fraud law. What would have been issue
preclusion from Florida would have been carried over to issue preclu-
sion into the other twenty-seven states.
Let’s go ahead and say the last thing here. If we could make a fed-
eral mail fraud case in Florida, and incidentally the evidence was
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there, we were going to make it. I mean, I’ve been trying federal
criminal cases for thirty years. This was an easy mail fraud case. It
would have been a lot of trouble to do it, but theoretically it was an
easy mail fraud case.
That’s not only issue preclusion in the other twenty-seven or
twenty-six states, that’s federal issue preclusion as well. The Attor-
ney General of the United States could bring a federal case and have
the same remedies that we got, which is liability for the conduct es-
tablished in Florida, national conspiracy.
Since we were going to ask for the profits in the end, we would
have gotten probably gross profits in Florida. She can get, Attorney
General Janet Reno could get, gross profits throughout the United
States and the world, because if they violated RICO in Florida and
the predicate offenses are the same, then they violated federal RICO,
and it’s now not back to 1977, it is back to 1970. Whatever the indus-
try can do, they can afford to pay off individual taxpayer suits or in-
dividual smoker suits. They can afford to pay off individual attorney
general suits, state by state. They can’t afford to ever lose a RICO
case, because it is national.
Incidentally, if you can make this case civilly, and this evidence is
this good, you can make this case criminally.
The other thing that I think that dramatically changed the char-
acter of the case, and it is only partly related to RICO, and I say this
in the early part, is they changed in the 1950s from a legitimate in-
dustry to a corrupt industry. They actually had meetings in which
they discussed what to do about the health problem and decided to
run a scam instead of cleaning it up.
Who were the people who participated in this decision? I’m cha-
grined as a teacher and a member of the legal profession at what
some lawyers did. The tobacco lawyers designed this fraud, executed
this fraud, and kept it going the full length that it did. There may be
a four-year federal statute of limitations on civil damages. There is a
five-year continuing offense criminal limitation, and there is no ex-
culpation in federal criminal RICO for lawyers.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Professor Ehrhardt, I think you had
a few comments on the RICO evidentiary implications.
PROFESSOR EHRHARDT: There were some documents that the
trial team thought were essential. For example, the Surgeon Gen-
eral’s report indicating that cigarettes caused certain diseases. The
question was whether or not they were admissible in Florida under
the Florida evidence code.
It was my opinion that the answer probably was no. There is a
hearsay exception to the federal rules of evidence that we did not
adopt in Florida. And so we were sitting across the table one day, and
I said that I didn’t think that those documents can come in as exhib-
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its, because they are inadmissible hearsay. Bob was right across the
table from me, and replied, “Well, what about RICO?”
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: The key element in the scheme to de-
fraud is intent to defraud. Anything that bears on the intent of the
perpetrator comes in, and there are a whole bunch of rules that say
evidence of other crimes are only admissible if it is a common scheme
and plan. Well, once it becomes a scheme to defraud, and the scheme
to defraud begins in the early 1950s and comes to today, anything
that bore on their state of mind is admissible to show a scheme to de-
fraud.
They were lying to the Surgeon General, and that the Surgeon
General’s report then came out without the benefit of truth, it is go-
ing to come right in on the scheme to defraud. It may not have come
in as an independent report, but Chuck was wanting to tell me from
time to time if you can get it under one rule, it is in under all rules.
And I kept saying scheme to defraud, scheme to defraud. It turned
out that it widened the scope of everything that would come in. What
would be in a traditional case a common law murder, rape, or a rob-
bery, where you focus on a single crime, single day, and place, you
get very little in. But as soon as you make it a pattern of behavior, a
scheme of behavior, it all comes in. There is a paradox in this, by un-
dertaking to prove it, we acquired the duty to prove it. So it wasn’t
something that the judge had discretion on. He balanced prejudicial
value against probative value. We had said we are going to prove all
of this. Then we had to prove it all. The paradox of that is we could
prove it all, and they had very little ability to deal with much of that.
MR. GENTRY: Professor, I know you want Andy to give you some
documents.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: I do.
MR. GENTRY: Let me just mention one thing that was again fas-
cinating, because these things drove one another. Their major de-
fense to giving us a lot of the most incriminating documents was at-
torney-client privilege, which was a major part of the fraud, in that
they had misused the attorney-client privilege to create this scheme
to defraud.
When the Liggett settlement occurred, Liggett had to turn over
documents as part of the settlement. The Liggett documents were
very helpful and we were able to require them to do a privilege log
under the Rules of Civil Procedure. As you know, this has just re-
cently been amended in Florida to make it clear that if they claim a
privilege, they have to do a privilege log.
Through the privilege log we were able to identify documents as
appearing to be involved in a crime of fraud. That’s what Andy was
doing. But in order for them to claim, the other defendants to claim
the privilege to the Liggett documents, they had to come in and show
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that they had been associated together since the 1950s and 1960s
with a common enterprise which involved smoking and health issues,
appearing before regulatory boards, and protecting their mutual in-
terests.
We had fairly lengthy hearings in which we challenged their right
to claim a joint privilege, wherein they put on the record all the es-
sential ingredients to a RICO count, establishing that they were an
association, an enterprise, and establishing all the predicate neces-
sary, which we could literally and were simply going to read into the
record. The findings that the court made in order to allow them to
claim joint privilege walked them right into the RICO case, and then
we simply had to prove the predicate acts. Then after they had
claimed the joint privilege, the enterprise, through Andy’s work pri-
marily, we then went about getting the documents under the crime-
fraud exception.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Stuck between a rock and a hard
place.
MR. GENTRY: Well, they were between a rock and a hard place.
In order to protect on one issue, they walked themselves into another
issue. And I think, hopefully, we helped open the door for them.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: I do want to let Mr. Berly talk us
through some of the documents, but before I do that, I just wanted to
get a sense from Mr. Fonvielle. You were the keeper of your side’s
documents, as I understand it, with an army of some hundred people
or more in these rooms. Can you give us a brief sense of what that all
involved?
MR. GENTRY: Where did that army come from, David? I haven’t
heard about that army.
MR. FONVIELLE: I don’t know which army the Attorney General
is talking about.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Okay.
MR. FONVIELLE: If he is talking about the army that tobacco—
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: You wish you had an army, right?
MR. FONVIELLE: I guess along those lines one time towards the
end of the case we all were sitting down and we figured out that we
were basically outnumbered twenty to one. That was the number of
lawyers that we felt tobacco had against each one of us.
Your question is what now?
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Well, really just to describe what
that was all like, your job of keeping track of the documents and pro-
ducing documents, and how that all worked.
MR. FONVIELLE: Well, tobacco as you heard from General But-
terworth this morning, it is obvious that a tactic they had was to, as
the General put it, break our back with discovery. Tobacco came into
town and announced that they were going to discover every docu-
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ment within the State of Florida’s archives, from every office in town.
In fact, they began to do that. Tobacco came in and moved high speed
copiers into different locations around the city. They gave them per-
mission and gave them rooms in different buildings. They actually
came in with two and three high speed copiers, and began copying
millions of documents.
The strategy that we took, which became obvious, was basically to
sit back and let them copy, and let them go their way. Now, behind
the scenes what we were really doing was that every time they would
go into a different bureau or department or whatever within the
state, we would be over there. We would be talking to the general
counsel. We would be talking to the staff lawyers, and we would be
looking for the gist of what it is that department did. In fact, we had
sufficient documents to know what they were going to find, although
we didn’t have the surprise documents. We didn’t have each one of
them, and tobacco would find them. The other thing that we knew is
that after tobacco did all this, they were creating a problem for them-
selves, which they did. They ended up with millions and millions and
millions of documents.
They would come in when they started taking the depositions of
the state officials and so forth, very many times they couldn’t find the
document they needed, although they would bring two and three
paralegals with them. The paralegals would give them ten docu-
ments when the lawyer would ask for one of them, and the lawyer
couldn’t figure out which one it was half the time.
The other problem they had is that we knew that when we got
down to trial time that the tobacco industry was going to have to
identify their exhibits. That really did turn out to be a problem for
tobacco because once they started identifying them, identifying the
exhibits, it was quite easy for us to focus in on what they were doing.
But as far as the hundreds of lawyers, I think maybe the General
could have been talking about the fact that, in fact I was, we were,
given access to every state lawyer here. I had meetings actually. I
would have group meetings with all the general counsels of all the
state agencies, give them the directions on what we were doing, and
they would go back out and periodically we would have to meet
again. It was a massive effort, but it worked. We kept up with to-
bacco and they didn’t break our back.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: What you accomplished is almost
inconceivable to me, having had to do document production for a
number of much, much, much, much smaller cases, which alone can
almost break your back. So to have handled this as you did is a real
achievement.
MR. FONVIELLE: Well, as it ended up when we were down ready
for trial I had every document, and still have every document in our
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office that we felt tobacco was going to use against us. I think those
documents took up about 130 boxes, file boxes in the office, as op-
posed to the three, four, five million documents that they have.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Mr. Berly, we are ready for you. I
understand you have some of the key documents and you are going to
show us and walk us through some of the most important aspects of
that.
MR. BERLY: Yeah, I’ve got various types, various issues. I think
it might help to put into perspective just how extraordinarily profit-
able this industry is. It sometimes answers the question, people
sometimes wonder how in the world the tobacco industry did what it
did or why it did what it did. It would appear that it’s really all about
money.
The question really ought to be what wouldn’t a company do to
protect a fifty plus billion dollar-a-year income stream. This is a piece
of a speech that was prepared for the chairman of B&W to be given
here in Florida back in 1983, and he says it quite nicely. Again keep
in mind the time frames and you can imagine how much more profit-
able it is today.
He says in great understatement:
Tobacco is big business. Consumers buy tobacco products at the
rate of a thousand packs a second. That’s 32 billion packs a year.
62 million Americans smoke. A one point share in the market rep-
resents 170 million in sales. And for the year 1981, Brown and
Williamson had profits, actual operating income of about $5 mil-
lion a week.
So again, putting back in time perspective sort of helps explain
why the industry reacted as rabidly as they did in many instances.
Another speech by a Brown and Williamson executive in 1980 in
Texas, this fellow happens to have a way with words when you start
talking about RICO and concerted action. This guy and many others,
they like to talk about we are in combat, we’re in the trenches, we’re
on the front. He says, “I want to take a few minutes this afternoon to
talk to you about how we must come together as a company, as an
industry, not only to sell our products, but to shape our future.”
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Were these all documents that you
obtained through the discovery process?
MR. BERLY: Through discovery, he goes on and says, “We must
analyze and combat the hostile environment that surrounds and
squeezes our marketplace.”
Again, the amount of money at stake here is mind boggling. “If the
public smoking regulations forced each smoker in this country to re-
duce consumption by only one cigarette per day, the loss to our in-
dustry would be half a billion dollars per year.” Again this shows why
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they fight as hard as they do in every state, local municipality, wher-
ever. In his nice language he continues:
In fact, a strong case can be made that unless the industry begins
to assert itself more aggressively, it will become stylish not to
smoke, and then we can expect industry sales to take their first
significant reduction in a decade. That is a pessimistic but realistic
scenario.
It is one that commands the industry to unite the entire tobacco
family. Every man and woman who are part to preserve one of
America’s largest, and most significant industries.
One thing we found over and over is they like to refer to the to-
bacco family, which always made Professor Blakey sort of warm in-
side. It sort of went with the Cosa Nostra. He sort of ends up in his
normal lingo, “This means that all businesses and especially the to-
bacco industry will have to mobilize all of its family if we are to be a
significant voice in the 1980s rather than its victims.” This document
and this tenor and this wording is really very typical of what the in-
dustry did. They really had declared war on the public health of
America, and this is a good example of their sort of combat-siege
mentality.
The next document is one of my favorites. It comes from a re-
searcher, Dr. Greig, with British American Tobacco in London.6 They
are having a little conference. They are trying to figure out how to
market their products and what are they going to do. Keep in mind
now the industry says cigarettes are not a drug and nicotine is not a
drug. They sent their CEOs to Congress to swear to that effect. You
can see what they say internally when nobody is looking over their
shoulder and they’re writing their own documents.
Dr. Greig says the cigarette as a drug administration system for
public use has very, very significant advantages. He talks about how
in ten seconds it goes to the brain, that the user gets a hit. Keep in
mind that the FDA—that’s the Food and Drug Administration—is
supposed to have jurisdiction over things that affect the brain, affect
the form and structure of the body.
Here is a fellow at BATCo pretty much making a four-square ad-
mission as to that is what their product is. He continues. He says
that we have an emerging picture of a fast, highly pharmacologically
effective and cheap drug, tobacco. All in all it is a relatively cheap
and efficient delivery system, legal and easily usable. In great under-
statement he says, however, it has its drawbacks. He describes it as
a “health shadow.”
                                                                                                                   
6. See C.C. Greig, Structured Creativity Group, Thoughts by C.C. Greig, Marketing
Scenario (infra Appendix 1).
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PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Now, these kind of documents that
are obviously real good for you and real bad for them, did you get the
sense that they made any effort to try to destroy documents or hide
documents or they were forthright with the production once they lost
on their various attorney-client privileges and so on defenses?
MR. BERLY: I’ve got a few in here that I will pull out to show you
some of their efforts at document destruction and shipping them
overseas so they would not be found. But no, getting documents out
of them was truly like pulling teeth.
This is the way Dr. Greig ends up, just a wonderful quote from
Oscar Wilde. “A cigarette is a perfect type of perfect pleasure. It is
exquisite and leaves one unsatisfied. What more can one want.” Then
he goes on and he says: “Let us provide the exquisiteness and hope
that they, our consumers, continue to remain unsatisfied. All we
would want then is a larger bag to carry the money to the bank.”
That pretty much puts into perspective their attitude. The industry
of course denies to this very day, or many of them do, that smoking
causes disease.
Here is a 1978 memo about a phone call that Dr. Colby from Rey-
nolds has had with a doctor from Imperial in London and also a Dr.
Felton, who is the chief scientist for British American.7 He says, “We
have known for many years that Dr. Felton basically agrees with the
views of the anti-tobacco scientists who allege that it has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt that smoking causes lung cancer.” He goes
on and he says that Dr. Felton so disagrees with the industry posi-
tion, that he calls the tobacco industry scientists members of the
“Flat Earth Society.” Here you are in 1978, the chief scientist for
British American believes that beyond a reasonable doubt smoking
causes disease. But they’ve never told the public that.
You mention destroying documents. These are, as I recall, the
notes of Dr. Osdene from Philip Morris.8 Very hard to read so I will
read it for you. There was this organization by the way called
INBIFO. The industry did a lot of its very secret biological research
in Germany, where they didn’t want it to be found out. The organiza-
tion INBIFO in Cologne, Germany.
Dr. Osdene says, “Ship all documents to Cologne by hand. Keep in
Cologne. Okay to phone and Telex. These will be destroyed. If impor-
tant letters have to be sent, please send to home. I will act on them
and destroy.” Dr. Osdene was not alone in his desire to keep things
from being found. There was a procedure set up wherein certain
documents were declared as “dead wood.”9 You can imagine what
                                                                                                                   
7. See Memorandum from Dr. F.G. Colby to the file (June 1, 1978) (infra Appendix
2).
8. See Notes from Dr. Osdene, Phillip Morris (undated) (infra Appendix 3).
9. See Memorandum from J.K. Wells to the file (Jan. 17, 1985) (infra Appendix 4).
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that involves. They had the Assistant General Counsel at Brown and
Williamson go through their files and attempt to purge things.
Of course, he submitted affidavits, mind you, that say this really
didn’t happen, and I really didn’t mean this, and these words don’t
say what they say, but you can read the document. He’s gone through
and he’s marked with an “X” those things that he considers dead
wood. And what’s he going to do with them? He is going to undertake
to remove them from the files. They are going to consider shipping
them back overseas to BAT when it is done.
Last paragraph, Carol Lincoln is B&W’s librarian. It says:
I mentioned to Carol Lincoln that the offshore research and engi-
neering studies sent to B&W in care of Earl and Bob during
roughly the last year had not even been sent to her for logging in.
Those documents are in the offices Earl and Bob and would not be
reflected on the list that you’ve reviewed.10
So in other words, some of the really sensitive documents would
get sent from B&W’s sister company, BATCo, to B&W, they’re not
even put in the files. The ones that do get there are now being de-
clared dead wood and they’re getting shipped back to England so that
they will not get discovered in litigation.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: That’s basically because you
couldn’t reach them with a subpoena over in England?
MR. BERLY: Exactly, exactly.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: Why would they rather send them
over there instead of burn them or shred them or whatever?
MR. BERLY: Why did Nixon keep his tapes? I don’t know. Re-
member the frank statement? They pledged to cooperate with all
public health authorities. Here is a Telex from the general counsel of
Brown and Williamson to the chairman of BAT in London, Mr.
McCormick, copies going to the chairman of B&W, where they agree
to withhold from the Surgeon General a new report that Battelle
Labs had done.11
This is way back in 1963. This report has been described as being
very cutting edge, nicotine, and here they are deciding not to turn it
over to the Surgeon General, notwithstanding they say they are dis-
turbed at its implication for cardiovascular disorders, but they didn’t
cooperate. The industry was sort of into destroying documents,
things that weren’t real helpful to them, if you believe what their
documents say. Then references to crime-fraud and the involvement
of lawyers. Here is a memo concerning a Committee of Counsel
                                                                                                                   
10. Id. at 2.
 11. See Cable from the General Counsel of Brown & Williamson to Mr. McCormick,
Chairman, British American Tobacco Co.  (July 3, 1963) (infra Appendix 5).
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meeting.12 Committee of Counsel basically ran the industry. They
were their lawyers. Rather than cooperating with the government,
what you see them doing here is saying they are going to stall any
disclosure by the industry. They basically want HHS to think they
are cooperating with them, but they really are not.
Then it goes on, and they describe the position by Mr. Northrip of
the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, which now has found itself as
a defendant in a number of these lawsuits nationwide.
This is what Mr. Northrip has suggested, apparently, to the in-
dustry that they would do. It says, “The product liability litigation
risk position stated by Bob Northrip is based on the opinion that it
would be more difficult to defend against adverse assessments of ad-
ditives by an industry panel than by an adverse assessment by HHS
scientists.”13
They desperately wanted the industry to have control. You see
what the Northrip position is. He said that by keeping it in house
with the industry it would enable the company to control and termi-
nate the research, remove the additives and destroy the data. Hope-
fully it could be done prior to the adoption of the additives, but if a
test were made of an additive in current use, the additive could be
discontinued and eliminated from Covington and Burling, another
law firm that finds itself as a defendant in some cases, before HHS
has an opportunity to make comments.14 So again, the additives, the
ingredients that go into cigarettes, there is a plan here that if they
turn out bad, they will be destroyed. And then hopefully the con-
suming public would never know.
Let me skip over and find a couple of documents relating to tar-
geting youth. The industry, of course, says over and over and over we
are not after the youth market. We don’t try to entice people to start
smoking, we simply want to get those people who are already smok-
ing to switch brands.
MR. GENTRY: That’s 1986, right?
MR. BERLY: 1976. This is a ten-year forecast. This is from a Dr.
Teague at Reynolds.15 They have obtained the most incredible deposi-
tion testimony from Dr. Teague where he now says that all these
documents, and he wrote quite a number of them, that he wrote were
just the musings of a private man sitting on company time, just sort
of thinking about all the “what-ifs.” That’s his testimony.
                                                                                                                   
12. See Memorandum from J.K. Wells, III, Committee of Counsel, to E. Pepples (Sept.
25, 1981) (infra Appendix 6).
13. Id. at 3.
14. See id.
15. See RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, PLANNING
ASSUMPTIONS AND FORECAST FOR THE PERIOD OF 19XX (illegible)-1986 (Mar. 15, 1976) (in-
fra Appendix 7).
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Anyway, look what Dr. Teague writes when nobody is looking over
his shoulder. “Evidence is now available to indicate that the 14 to 18-
year-old group is an increasing segment of the smoking population.
RJR must soon establish a successful new brand in this market if our
position in the industry is to be maintained over the long term.”16
Now, I don’t know where you are going to find it legal to sell to four-
teen and fifteen year-olds. Dr. Teague was busy trying to find them.
This is a document that came out in Florida and has been re-
ported on by the press. Pretty funny, pretty sad, but funny. It’s called
Project Kestrel.17 This is a British-American Tobacco document.
Objective: To develop a brand which breaks the rules. To appeal to
a new generation and shock their parents: to make conventional
brands look bland and weary.
There seems here to be an opportunity to explore many unconven-
tional routes towards this target, without the need to understand
why they may be popular.
It was felt that the literate youth of today, being very image ori-
ented, would require a brand of cigarettes which was not an at-
tempt to match any other brand, like Marlboro for instance, but
which was completely unconventional which set new standards en-
couraging their rebellion, not necessarily just against parents but
certainly against the market norm. It would respond to the per-
son’s individuality with the possibility of being an alternative to
drugs. It was felt that the cigarette should incorporate some sort of
“kick” of a similar nature to the Coca Cola “kick,” giving the ciga-
rette a physiological effect. A possible route for this would be to in-
corporate the AMTECH technology, using ammonia to generate
nicotine enhancement, ensuring pH distortion to liberate the nico-
tine.18
It goes on. Again, remember, they don’t market to kids.
Two flavors which were discussed as options were Root Beer &
Brazilian Fruit Juice, both of which tend to appeal to the younger
generation while being rejected by their parents.
The cigarettes should have a totally new brand name so that no
pre-conceived ideas could be formed, and should reflect the durable
youth values discussed (rebellion, glamour of danger, etc.).
In short then, anything goes. The cigarette should not be judged,
in any way, by the normal smoker, but purely by the literate
youth.19
MR. GENTRY: Andy, I don’t want to interrupt you. We got this
document, and we thought it was so good that it had to be fake. I
mean we absolutely couldn’t believe it, and in response, rather than
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17. See infra Appendix 8.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 2.
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disavowing it, they admitted it was their document but said they
didn’t know when it was actually prepared. So we were totally
shocked that it was a real document.
MR. BERLY: We had nothing else in Florida regarding this proj-
ect, Project Kestrel, but in other cases that my firm is involved in, we
fortunately now have quite a number of other Project Kestrels. So
while we might have had a problem using this document in Florida,
we shouldn’t have that problem elsewhere.
Another Brown and Williamson document. This is pretty clear.
Youth cigarette, new concepts.20 A youth oriented cigarette. “It’s a
well known fact that teenagers like sweet products. Honey might be
considered.”21 They don’t market to kids, though.
Just so I’m not picking on B&W, Lorillard: “[T]he base of our
business is the high school student.”22
MR. GENTRY: Andy, do you have that UK document from 1988 to
let people know this is still going on, the ETS document?
MR. BERLY: Yes.
MR. GENTRY: Why don’t you throw that one in?
MR. BERLY: Let me do this one just because I’m right at it. 1962.
Brown and Williamson. Their executives, as late as 1994, swear that
nicotine isn’t addictive. Take a look at what their chief scientific ad-
visor to the board of directors, Sir Charles Ellis, says. “Lastly,
smoking is a habit of addiction that is pleasurable. Many people
therefore find themselves subconsciously prepared to believe that it
must be wrong.”23 This is the number one scientist for, at that time,
the largest, most international tobacco company in the world. This is
what Sir Charles says.
Another guy that has a real way with words is Dr. Dunn from
Philip Morris, one of their chief researchers. He was in charge of
their nicotine research. Again, keep in mind that their view is nico-
tine is not addictive, and that anybody can quit, and it is easy to quit,
and so forth. This is a speech that Dr. Dunn gives. He says:
As with eating and copulating, so it is with smoking. The
physiological effect serves as the primary incentive; all other in-
centives are secondary.
. . . .
The cigarette should be conceived not as a product, but as a
package. The product is nicotine. The cigarette is but one of many
                                                                                                                   
20. See MARKETING INNOVATIONS, INC., BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO
CORPORATION PROJECT REPORT (Sept. 1972) (infra Appendix 9).
21. Id. at 1.
22. Memorandum from T.L. Achey to Curtis Judge 1 (Aug. 30, 1978) (infra Appendix
10).
23. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION, SMOKING AND HEALTH—POLICY
ON RESEARCH 3 (1962) (infra Appendix 11).
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package layers. There is the carton, which contains the pack,
which contains the cigarette, which contains the smoke. The
smoke is the final package. The smoker must strip off all these
package layers to get to that which he seeks.24
Then he goes on and says that smoke “is beyond question the most
optimized vehicle of nicotine, and the cigarette is the most optimized
dispenser of smoke.”25
I will read one more and then I will stop. W.C. asked about a 1988
document that was uncovered in Florida. As you know, the cigarette
industry’s main public relations theme is that there is doubt or con-
troversy over whether smoking causes disease, they have done that
with respect to smoking as well as environmental tobacco smoke.
This document happens to address environmental tobacco smoke.
The background for this is that Philip Morris decides to go to British
American Tobacco in London in 1988 and try to get BAT on board
with what it is doing on a global basis.26 Their purpose as they say
here is Philip Morris is doing, making this effort to keep the contro-
versy alive. It says they are spending vast sums of money to do so.27
Philip Morris is meeting in London with The Tobacco Institute’s law-
yers, Covington and Burling, who now find themselves as defendants
in at least one of these lawsuits.
It talks about the financial burden that Philip Morris has and how
they are trying to get people to go in and help them. What they’re ba-
sically doing is buying up scientists so that they can manufacture
science. They can go out and get published somewhere something
that says that ETS isn’t harmful.
It says, “The Philip Morris philosophy of ETS was presented. This
appeared to revolve around the selection, in all possible countries, of
a group of scientists either to critically review the scientific literature
on ETS to maintain controversy, or to carry out research on ETS.”28
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: And they claim controversy means
to have a position out there that says it is not addictive?
MR. BERLY: Exactly. It gets clearer in the paragraph right here
as to exactly what they are up to. They talk about how the lawyers
are going to filter it, how the scientists will be found by the lawyers.
They make sure that they did not have any view that was adverse to
the company.29
                                                                                                                   
24. WILLIAM L. DUNN, JR., PHILLIP MORRIS RESEARCH CENTER, MOTIVES AND
INCENTIVES IN CIGARETTE SMOKING 4, 5 (undated) (infra Appendix 12).
25. Id. at 6.
26. See Dr. Sharon Boyse, British American Tobacco Co., Note on a Special Meeting of
the UK Industry on Environmental Tobacco Smoke (Feb. 17, 1988) (infra Appendix 13).
27. See generally id.
28. Id. at 2.
29. See id. at 3.
1998]                         TOBACCO SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT 791
Then it says, and it doesn’t get much clearer than this, “groups of
scientists should be able to produce research or stimulate controversy
in such a way that public affairs people in the relevant countries will
be able to make use of, or market, that information.”30
I mean it just doesn’t get any clearer than that. There is a docu-
ment written by the former chairman of Brown and Williamson that
says “doubt is our product.” It is the most effective way for us to cre-
ate controversy. And that was dated like in 1962. And here they are
in 1988.
Now, you talk about a scheme or a pattern of misconduct, a
scheme or pattern to defraud, when you have something that starts
in 1954 in connection with the formation of the TIRC, and this one
just happens to be dated in 1988, but it continues to this day . . . .
I’ve got dozens more, but in the interest of time that’s probably
enough.
PROFESSOR STERNLIGHT: That was terrific. Thank you.
IV.   PANEL DISCUSSION III: LITIGATION IN THE LARGER CONTEXT:
THE LEGAL AND POLICY LESSONS OF THE LAWSUIT AND ITS
RESOLUTION
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Welcome back to the concluding panel
of our symposium today, which has the working title of “Litigation in
the Larger Context: The Legal and Policy Lessons of the Lawsuit and
Its Resolution.”
I guess to some extent using the term “resolution” may be a little
bit premature. We certainly have a settlement agreement in Florida,
but as you’ve heard this morning, there are remaining aspects to be
addressed.
Before we get into that, let me introduce our two newest panelists.
One is familiar to you, Dean Paul LeBel, of the FSU College of Law,
whose introductory remarks were part of the program with Governor
Chiles this morning.
Dean LeBel has taught at the University of Alabama and for the
last fifteen years at William and Mary, where he was the Cutler Pro-
fessor of Law. He joined us at FSU this summer to begin his service
as Dean of the Florida State University College of Law.
He is a national expert in tort law, particularly products liability
law, and what I kiddingly refer to as “sin product” liability. He is the
author of a recent book regarding alcohol-related liability entitled
John Barleycorn Must Pay.31
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The other person joining us for the first time this afternoon is
Larry Garvin of the FSU faculty. Larry is a graduate of the Yale Law
School, which he attended after obtaining degrees from Michigan
State University and the University of Michigan. His field is primar-
ily commercial law, but like a moth to a flame he has been drawn to
the interesting but tortured aspects of mass tort litigation. As a law-
yer in Washington, he had practiced in some of the cutting edge ar-
eas of mass tort litigation, and had been involved with some of the
major litigation issues in years past.
In terms of the continuing saga of the tobacco litigation, I wanted
to ask Andy Berly: What is the status of the related litigation of the
Ness, Motley firm of Charleston? I certainly don’t mean this dispar-
agingly, but I’ve heard Ness, Motley referred to as the Wal-Mart of
plaintiffs’ personal injury and product liability litigation, or the
McDonalds of product liability litigation, which I consider a compli-
ment actually. There is more than a kernel of truth in those descrip-
tions. Your firm is involved in litigation across the country in these
matters. I wonder if you could bring us up to date on that other liti-
gation, particularly with regard to its relation to the Florida litiga-
tion.
MR. BERLY: There are presently something like I think forty-one
or forty-two of these attorney general-type lawsuits that are pending.
My firm is involved in a number of them. The next one set to go to
trial is in Texas. It actually should be in trial now, but it has been
postponed. The judge unfortunately was diagnosed with cancer, and
there has been a postponement of the trial. We really don’t know
when that will gear up. If it does not begin within the next six weeks
or so, then that probably means the next case up will be the Minne-
sota case, which starts, I think, in mid-January.
So these cases are still proceeding at full pace, notwithstanding
the fact that there is the national settlement agreement. That, of
course, has not been finalized. It has not been enacted and I guess
really until Congress does act one way or another, certainly our firm
and all these firms that are going on behalf of plaintiffs will be
working full speed ahead in getting these cases to trial just as rap-
idly as we can.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: This morning Attorney General But-
terworth sounded as though it was only a matter of checking off days
on the calendar until the national agreement was finalized in some
form. That certainly wasn’t the impression I had reading the news-
papers in the aftermath of the national settlement. Has there devel-
oped any particular consensus or odds-making on the part as to the
likelihood of the national settlement?
MR. BERLY: I personally have never really been involved in those
matters, but my understanding is that the attorneys general are very
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optimistic there will indeed be a global settlement, and it is just a
matter of getting into the new calendar year, the next legislative
year. Everything that I hear is fairly positive, although there again
you do read some stuff that is negative. I heard General Butterworth
this morning sound pretty positive that it will be done in the first
half of next year, and I don’t know anything to the contrary, but then
again that’s not really what I do, and that’s not what I know the most
about.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Picking up on this morning’s panels, as
well, the question was asked, “What is the stopping point?” Will there
be other suits against other products, and so on?
I would like to throw open for the panel generally but address it to
Wayne Hogan perhaps first. Has tobacco been unfairly singled out?
Is the statute coiled and ready for operation against other busi-
nesses? In particular, the reason I’m addressing it to Wayne, you’ve
been very active in the asbestos litigation over the years. That’s an-
other product that’s had substantial punitive awards entered against
some of the defendants, substantial monetary awards, and has done
a good deal of damage over the years. But was that ever considered?
Were asbestos claims ever pursued as a Medicaid reimbursement ac-
tion in some quarters?
MR. HOGAN: No, not that I know of in terms of the State cer-
tainly. I have no idea if they considered that product or other prod-
ucts besides cigarettes to be the likely subject of this form of action
taking advantage of the 1994 amendments combined with the 1990
amendments.
It is, of course, the case that the ordinary rules that apply to
Medicaid reimbursement in Florida and in other states where a tort
action is pursued on an individual basis by, say, an asbestos victim
who also was a Medicaid patient, under those circumstances there is
a format that is available to enable the state to be repaid for the
Medicaid expenditures. That has been in place for some period of
time.
So you have a situation where, say, in the field of asbestos, that
industry has the argument that their product provided benefits from
an industrial-base standpoint, but also some hazards that were obvi-
ous in the end.
But those cases, unlike cigarette cases, have been able to be suc-
cessfully handled by plaintiffs’ lawyers over a substantial period of
time, thirty years now, going on when you take it from the very first
case, the Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.32 case in Texas in
1973.
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794 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:737
So in comparing the two products, for cigarettes, except for the
Carter case that was discussed by Dean LeBel this morning, and we
know the history of Cipollone before that, there have been no other
successes. If Carter had been a Medicaid recipient, he was not, but
had he been, then there would be a means by which the state would
be reimbursed for medical expenses paid for by Medicaid. So I don’t
see that industry or the drug industry, or for that matter the alcohol
industry being in the same posture as the cigarette industry, consid-
ering the addictiveness of cigarettes.
I haven’t read Dean LeBel’s book on John Barleycorn, but my un-
derstanding from what we learned during the course of this case is
that the addictiveness of cigarettes is nine or ten times greater than
the addictiveness of alcohol, so you’ve got a much larger population
which is put in the circumstance of being just cigarette after ciga-
rette after cigarette that they are smoking because of the addiction.
So I don’t see the likelihood of that being true for other products.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Jeff, it might be worthwhile to comment
on whether RICO would have an application to other industries.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: And I can think of exactly the sort of
person who might be able to comment on that.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: There are two RICOs. There’s federal
RICO and state RICO. And there are two possible plaintiffs, the in-
dividual consumer, we would call it, and a state.
Consumers have had no success in using the federal statute as a
basis for products liability. The principal reason they haven’t is that
the federal statute does not authorize recovery for personal injury. It
is only for injury to business or property. So the federal statute is
knocked out as a possible products liability claim.
In the states, some do authorize personal injury recovery and
some don’t. The difficulty that you would have is that it is not simply
showing a defective product. You have to show the systemic fraud for
an individual to use the Statute. My guess is, for example, if you took
alcohol, I think you would have a hard time making the case that the
alcohol industry has done anything even remotely related to what
was done by the tobacco industry.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Let me play devil’s advocate for a mo-
ment. There seems to be, at least just from reading the paper casu-
ally, a tendency toward targeting the young in alcohol sales: sweeter
drinks, creamy drinks, milk shaky sort of drinks, things like that. Is
it your view that it is so different in quality that you can’t compare it
to tobacco?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Well, I’m the one who thought in the first
blush you could not apply this to the tobacco industry. I’m either
wishy-washy or I can’t make up my mind.
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When I learned the evidence in the tobacco industry, I thought it
could be applied. I would simply have to say to the degree that I
know the alcohol industry, my judgment would be not, and I would
say the same thing for cars or drugs or substances generally. On the
other hand, if you can show that an industry is engaging in a sys-
temic pattern of fraud that is inflicting personal injury, you might be
able to do a state-level RICO.
The one industry where it does I think promise—or threaten, it
depends on your perspective—is in the medical industry generally.
Medical fraud is systemic in hospitals and among doctors and in
Medicare.
Forgetting for a moment the product, and looking at the people
who process medical services, my estimation is that both false claims
acts and RICO will be increasingly used in medical fraud.
I don’t think the rest of us should have any fear of that. If we
squeezed out of the medical system the enormous fraud where the
public pays and therefore nobody cares by vigorous application of
false claims statutes, which most states now have, or RICO statutes,
which a number of states have, I think that would probably be a good
thing.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: We’ve been dancing around the liquor
liability question with an authority right at our fingertips here. I
should ask the author of John Barleycorn Must Pay. I understand
that Dean LeBel and his products liability students have come up
with a working title should he ever address the tobacco situation—
Joe Camel Must Pay.
Let me ask you that, Paul. Do you concur with the assessment
that the other panelists have given regarding what’s different about
alcohol versus tobacco?
DEAN LeBEL: I do. As was said by the Governor and the Attor-
ney General and many people in the morning sessions, tobacco is ab-
solutely unique in that it causes harm to the user as a necessary
by-product of its normal use. There is no other product about which
we can say that. Without rehashing what went into a couple hundred
page book, John Barleycorn doesn’t have to pay for much.
What I developed in that book was a proposal for a tax on alcohol
that would be used to finance a special fund for the undercompen-
sated victims of drunk drivers. In a passing paragraph at the end of
the book I said that this idea might have some applicability to the to-
bacco industry if the scientific evidence on secondhand smoke, envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke, rises to the level of convincing proof.
I think that is the way to go. I see this Florida litigation as a very
encouraging sign. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said
the states were laboratories, and what this litigation that we’ve
heard so much about today stands for is a successful conclusion of an
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experiment in the Florida laboratory. It’s an experiment that reflects
what I think is the most significant development in contemporary
tort law.
That is a growing recognition of the public interest that is deeply
involved in the resolution of what had historically been viewed as
matters of individual responsibility for harm caused by wrongful act.
This lawsuit and its settlement indicates that however egre-
gious—and it is impossible to overstate how egregious the tobacco
company behavior has been over the years—however egregious that
behavior is, the public at large suffers and is entitled to some relief in
various forms. What I would do, I am more skeptical about the pros-
pects for the global settlement in Congress. But that I think is not
based on any special understanding of what Congress is likely to do
here. I think it’s a reflection of a deeper skepticism about Congress in
general.
What I would like to see is a continuing responsibility on the in-
dustry to provide for the medical care for tobacco-related harms. And
the way to do that it seems to me is not so much through individual
state-by-state settlements of claims of this sort, but through a much
higher tax on tobacco products that is used to set up a fund from
which medical health care providers could be compensated directly. I
don’t think the public interest is well served by transferring vast
amounts of wealth from the tobacco industry to smokers who at least
initially chose to smoke, and to those whose claims are derived from
the smokers.
I do think the public interest is very well served by transferring
those vast amounts of wealth from the tobacco industry to the health
care industry. There was a question earlier this morning about the
tax effects of this litigation, a question that was directed to the At-
torney General. Will there be a tax cut as a result of this settlement?
No, of course not. I don’t mean to be quite that flippant. It is unlikely
that there would be a tax cut. But a tax that was paid by the users of
the dangerous product would shift some of the costs away from the
population in general that pays those costs through health care ex-
penses generally and health insurance premiums in particular.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Mr. Gentry.
MR. GENTRY: I think it is important to put an exclamation point
on this question, and this answer to this question, because as you
know, Associated Industries and the tobacco industry spent several
millions of dollars trying to convince small business people that every
laundromat and every seller of milk and bacon and sugar is going to
be sued under this act.
As I mentioned earlier this morning, as a practical matter it can’t
happen. One, it would be totally cost ineffective to bring this sort of
action against any other industry that I can identify, and I can as-
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sure you I’ve thought about it a lot. There is no other industry like
tobacco. Not even alcohol which, in fact, in our hearings, when they
were trying to put on evidence of what the State did with alcohol, ar-
guing they were entitled to put that on to show the State had not
taken appropriate steps with tobacco, our response was, “Well, wait a
minute, are you saying you are willing to be regulated like alcohol,
because, if you are, we may be able to resolve this lawsuit.” They
would immediately run and hide.
And you know, people forget that alcohol is strictly regulated.
There are strict rules on how you sell it, where you sell it, when you
sell it. You can’t go get a bottle of whiskey out of a vending machine
in the store next to the school. So to try to compare other products to
tobacco is totally false, but they did a good job in the state of using
that as a basis to try to repeal this act.
Secondly, there simply is no other product that has created the
carnage that this has. As Wayne says, there is no other product that
has no utility. This product has no utility. There is no other drug at
least that I’m aware of that we yet know of that is out there in the
marketplace to be consumed by anyone that is not regulated by the
FDA. So it is just fallacious to suggest that this statute could be used
for another industry.
And finally, to me, what has happened in Florida and is happen-
ing around the country, but certainly what we did in Florida, has got
to be a tremendous vindication for the civil justice system. What
you’ve got is an industry that has been pervasive in our society. It
has co-opted the executive branch. It has co-opted the legislative
branch. Andy, through our discovery, found The Tobacco Institute
crowing over its great victories in the legislative halls, fighting back
any local ordinances to do with anti-smoking measures.
No one has been able to regulate these people or do anything
about it. It has only been through the court system that we have fi-
nally been able to hold them accountable. I think that’s what the
three branches of government are about, and I think that’s what is so
exciting about being a lawyer, that we know that ultimately, if we
can get into the judicial system, you can finally have a fair resolu-
tion, a fair answer.
It is just that we needed the tools to get us there, and a big
enough game, if you will, to justify bringing what amounted to tens
of millions of dollars of time and expense to bear on this industry. It
was only by virtue of the Act that we could finally really join issue
with it. And so I am very proud of what we did but also of the state,
that the State of Florida stepped up to the plate to do this. Appar-
ently it really wasn’t the state, it was the Governor and a couple of
people who were able to get this bill passed and then gave us the
tools to do it.
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But I can’t conceive that any industry anywhere should be fearful
of this sort of action being taken against them.
MR. HOGAN: I was going to take Dean LeBel’s idea about tax. I
now know there are some bills pending in Congress related to this
increased tax. Just think how hypothetical that would have sounded
just a couple of years ago.
Because we know about the power of this industry. General But-
terworth made the point they still had the power to slip through a
$50 billion tax credit even after this national settlement proposal
was done. Well, they’ve had that kind of control for forty, going on
fifty years. And so following up on what W.C. said, it is only by rea-
son of the fact that the civil justice system was able to step in and
make the inroads that we could then even get to the point of dis-
cussing with any semblance of reality the suggestion that you might
put a $1 or a $2 tax on cigarettes and have that kind of an increase.
One of the statistics that I learned during the course of this case is
shocking. The chart comes out of a book called The Tax Burden on
Tobacco, put out by The Tobacco Institute. When you look at the
charts, you realize that the tax percentage of the cost of a pack of
cigarettes in 1997 is less than the percentage of the tax that was on a
pack of cigarettes in the mid 1950s. Those increases that have oc-
curred over time in the price of cigarettes have typically been for
purposes of the profit of the companies, and not the tax. They’ve had
that kind of tremendous power, and the only way to break through
was to go some other route. That happened to be the civil justice sys-
tem.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Let me just follow up a little bit on one
of Wayne’s comments. It earlier struck me that with asbestos and
other types of mass torts, the private sector market, if you will,
seemed to be handling that fairly well, firms like yours and others
were willing and able to go toe to toe with manufacturers to extract
some settlements to get some verdicts. Tobacco, up until the recent
case in Jacksonville and the pyrrhic victory in Cipollone, has been
relatively unscathed. We’ve touched upon some of this before, but can
I throw this open to any of the panelists having had experience liti-
gating against tobacco and against other defendants?
What was different? Was it that they just had more money? Was
it that they were meaner, more cohesive? What would you say?
MR. HOGAN: Andy, you probably know, Andy probably knows the
documents better than I do to be able to quote it.
MR. BERLY: There is a document that is authored by one of Rey-
nolds’ trial counsel that says something like, to paraphrase General
Patton, the way we have won all these cases is by not spending all of
Reynolds’ money, but by making the other side spend all his. And
that pretty much puts it in perspective. They have run the lawyers
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into the ground by burying them with discovery, burying them with
motions, burying them with depositions. We were outnumbered at
least twenty to one.
MR. GENTRY: I think that’s important. Something is going on
right now around the country that tobacco I think is clearly behind.
They are attacking the ability of attorneys general to hire private
counsel as we speak.
We know in the State of Florida they were able to get legislation
passed to keep the AG from funding this litigation. And so we see
now an effort around the country legislatively and otherwise to pre-
vent public officials from having the authority to hire private coun-
sel.
The only reason we were successful is that we had a group of
eleven law firms, and we did have the Attorney General’s office who
did put tremendous resources into this fight.
But we’ve all litigated with Ford and Chrysler and the asbestos
industry and all that. But none of us, to my knowledge, has had a
case where I show up and there are literally twenty lawyers on the
other side. I’ve never had a case where we had to have seventy dis-
covery hearings. I mean, it is absolutely overwhelming. It is magni-
tudes of tenfold or a hundredfold compared to other litigation.
For example, with David, I have no question that they really
thought that they would just absolutely overwhelm us. Somehow we
were able to respond here in Tallahassee. So it’s just a matter of de-
gree. Yes, they hide documents and they do all the same things. But
when they do it, they just overwhelm.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Jeff, there are two sorts of jurispruden-
tial things that ought to be mentioned. The one is that the tort sys-
tem that developed in the nineteenth century in this country was de-
veloped in a different time and a different place.
At least one analysis of it is that it was designed to externalize the
cost of entrepreneurial capitalists. We lacked capital. What we
needed to do was concentrate it in railroads and developing busi-
nesses. To do that we developed a whole series of doctrines such as
the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk defense, contributory
negligence, that have the effect of letting capital concentrate in order
to allow the economy to develop. We got railroads and we got canals
out of it. We got our industrialization. It was in major part paid for
by the people who invested in it and lost the money or were even the
employees injured by the operations.
Many of those doctrines are still present in our law, and when we
have this modern phenomena of product liability, an interesting
thing that happened is that the judiciary principally stepped in and
modified many of those rules in order to shift the balance of the loss
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from the individual who suffered the cost or the damage and put it
back on the industry.
A lot of people objected to that, that this was legal change occur-
ring through the judiciary, when it should have taken place through
the legislature.
I think one of the unique aspects of the Florida situation is this
wasn’t just a bunch of private lawyers dreaming something up and
going out and convincing the judiciary to make these changes. If you
want to look for one person who brought this about, it was the Gov-
ernor who looked at the public policy issue and decided the change
had to occur, and exercised executive leadership. He then went
ahead, and you can get mad at him for how he got the legislation
through or kept it in, and, but for that legislative action, this suit
would never have occurred.
So this is not an example of private lawyers manipulating the ju-
diciary to produce a result that the community doesn’t want. This
was an example of legislative and/or executive leadership and then
legislative leadership that made it possible.
If you turn and even look at the RICO statute, it was not passed
to deal with the tobacco industry. On the other hand, the application
of general legislation to new problems has been a characteristic fea-
ture of our society for a long time. The antitrust statutes went
through thinking about the tobacco industry or the oil industry. It
subsequently was legitimately applied to intercollegiate athletics.
The civil rights statutes originally went through to deal with the Ku
Klux Klan in the south. It is now legitimately applied in prisons in
the north.
So it seems to me that this is not unique, but fully within our his-
tory and our tradition that the American system, legislative, execu-
tive, judicial, private lawyers, public lawyers, responded to a public
problem. There is a lot of, what shall I say, cynicism about the fact
that the government doesn’t work. In my own profession there are a
lot of law professors running around saying that law is politics and
politics is money.
Well, let me tell you, the law in this situation was not politics, and
it was not money. It was a public interest and it was seen by public
officials who had nothing to gain from it individually, who went into
the system, and the system—executive, legislative, judicial—was re-
sponsive to it and has begun to turn the problem around.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Let me ask you about this, playing the
cynic for a moment. This is a rather fragile victory. Another few
thousand votes and it would have been Governor Jeb Bush, not Gov-
ernor Lawton Chiles. One more vote in the supreme court and the
statute is unconstitutional. Instead of Judge Cohen, you could have
gotten a judge who used to represent tobacco companies. At that
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point, break any one of those links in the chain and it seems to come
apart.
Let me raise this with Larry Garvin and get him into the discus-
sion here. Am I being overly cynical? If it hadn’t been Florida, would
it have been some other state or does this suggest that maybe there
are some problems, whether we call them public choice related prob-
lems or otherwise, in trying to move against the juggernaut, so to
speak, if you would consider major industries to be juggernauts?
PROFESSOR GARVIN: Well, sure. These are necessarily some-
what fragile, particularly when you do have opponents so resolute, to
put it gently.
It may well have been necessary for something like this to come
about, to have as determined a governor as Governor Chiles and to
have the less than fully publicized initial enactment of the statute.
But here it is, and it is possible that this was a little fragile. It re-
mains fragile, that any number of things could have gone wrong.
But on the other hand, I don’t think that would have doomed
something like this. There may have been one of the best possible
circumstances for it to come about in a resolute governor, but there
are others. So that, itself, doesn’t trouble me. I am perhaps a trifle
less cynical than some, give me a few years.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Wayne.
MR. HOGAN: I would like to believe that even if we had failed on
the one vote in the legislature, or failed on the one vote in the su-
preme court, that once the challenge had been put out there, we
would have continued to stay at the drawing board to try to achieve
what we knew would be an important measure for public health.
Remember that we have our equity count in the complaint that is
still out there. It would have allowed us to ask the judge to enable us
to obtain discovery and the more facts that we saw, the more deter-
mined I think we were even if we had failed on some of these legal is-
sues.
There is a big distinction between what this lawsuit was about
and the individual tobacco or cigarette smokers’ cases. It is not nec-
essarily something that should be laid at the feet of those smokers,
because they are caught as teenagers. They become addicted. But
they face another major obstacle that we haven’t talked about yet to-
day.
I will lead into a question for W.C. and that has to do with the fact
that the political power of the cigarette industry was such back in the
1950s and into the 1960s, that when the revelations came out
through the Surgeon General’s report in 1964, about the learning
that they were developing on the disease causing capability of ciga-
rettes, the executives of the companies when they went and testified,
no, it doesn’t cause lung cancer, doesn’t do this, doesn’t do that; nev-
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ertheless, they understood that they were going to have to take, I
think they called it in the documents, “one step back in order to take
two steps forward.”
And so they actually, unknown to the general public, crafted the
language of the warning, so-called milquetoast as it was, that was
placed on the cigarette packages. They crafted it. And they put for-
ward an agenda. I think there were five items that actually were in-
corporated into the legislation to pass the Congress at that time.
Ever since then and especially when there was a slight change in
the warning in 1969, they have sought to use that warning in order
to defend against the lawsuits on the subject of preemption. Basically
saying, because part of their agenda was, look, we don’t want each of
these individual states to be passing their own legislation about how
cigarettes and the law should interact. We want to make it federal.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Clarify for the people who are listening
what you meant by preemption and the strategy that they employed
to defeat the local suits by going national and what that meant to us,
because that’s crucial.
MR. HOGAN: That point is that they were able to get the Con-
gress to pass a national rule so that they would then only be subject
to that rule from the standpoint of the federal government, and a
state could not have a higher requirement that would demand more
strict warnings, more explicit warnings than the Congress would al-
low.
And so in every one of these individual suits that is filed around
the country, one of the principal defenses is preemption. In fact, in
one of the Jacksonville trials the lawyer for the defendant, whether it
was Brown and Williamson or RJR, would simply stand up and he
would say preemption, and the rules would change right there in
front of the jury. W.C. was involved, as was Professor Blakey and
Professor Tribe, on the issue of whether the preemption that was at
issue in Cipollone would apply to this case.
MR. GENTRY: That is such a great example about the difference
between tobacco and other situations. People apparently don’t realize
this, and we were very fortunate to get Professor Tribe to come down.
He argued Cipollone on rehearing. Cipollone was a plurality decision.
But of the justices, three of them would have found no preemption
whatsoever. Four found very limited preemption, clearly stating it
doesn’t apply to fraudulent claims and basically limiting it to the
products that bear the warning, if you will.
Tobacco comes out of Cipollone having had an absolute disaster,
spins it publicly as being a victory, and you look around and damned
if the federal courts aren’t saying that these claims are preempted.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: Texas Supreme Court, too.
1998]                         TOBACCO SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT 803
MR. GENTRY: And the Texas Supreme Court in American To-
bacco Co. v. Grinnell.33 So many things went right that could have
gone wrong. Well, I’m not that cynical. Bob used to say “we are doing
God’s work.” And I really think we were, because one vote in the su-
preme court, one vote in the Senate, a different governor, I mean,
time and time again.
In our preemption memorandum, for example, it is really amaz-
ing. We were writing about Grinnell in the district court of Texas as
one of our major decisions that we were arguing as coming up with a
narrow preemptive effect to this tobacco issue on all fours, great de-
cision, and the young associate I had working with me, I asked him
to Shephardize all the cases on Saturday before we took the brief
down to the judge on Monday.
He found through WESTLAW that Grinnell had been overturned
in part, but we didn’t know what the decision was. We couldn’t be-
lieve that it could be that bad, but we pulled Grinnell totally out of
our memoranda because we didn’t know for sure what Grinnell held.
On Monday, when we got to the hearing and we were going to
have argument on Wednesday on preemption, they hand me a copy of
Grinnell, and it looks like something the tobacco industry would have
written.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: It was more outrageous than tobacco.
MR. GENTRY: Yes.
MR. GENTRY: But the point is that again this industry is so pow-
erful with its PR arm, and excellent lawyers. Anything I’ve said, I
certainly don’t mean to in anyway demean the lawyers. They have
excellent attorneys, lawyers today that represent tobacco.
It has also been ironic and intriguing to me and shows the system
does work. It is the lawyers today in 1996, 1997, that produced the
privilege logs. They fought us tooth and nail on these documents. But
they played by the rules. It was through their production that we
then discovered the crime-fraud of the predecessor attorneys.
But for the professionalism and the honesty of the lawyers that
we are litigating with today, as hard as they can litigate, we would
have never have discovered the crime and the fraud that had been
perpetrated by other lawyers in the 1950s and ‘60s and ‘70s. So they
have the very best lawyers, great lawyering. Everything is spun PR-
wise. The courts all over the country pick up on these things. And we
won in the supreme court, and we heard we lost. They lost Cipollone,
but you read that they won. And it is just, it is almost impossible.
Every time it is like one of those little machines you hit one and an-
other one pops up.
                                                                                                                   
33. 951 S.W. 2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
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PROFESSOR BLAKEY: You know, Jeff, it is worth going back to
your question, that if this was a monolithic country, all we would
have to do would be to corrupt one place and it would be all over
every place.
But there are so many centers of power in this country. People
talk about being cynical and they can’t change anything. This is the
case that proves that they are wrong. So many centers of power, so
many places where good people can do things that make a difference.
And I think that if it hadn’t happened in Florida, because it is a real
problem with real people we are dealing with, it would have hap-
pened in Texas, or it would have happened in Minnesota, or it would
have happened in New Jersey.
This is a wrong. The American people have identified it. The gov-
ernment, whatever you think about it, the government, in fact, and I
mean that not just as Washington, is responsible. And it is not cor-
rupt. The law does work. And that’s one of the messages that ought
to come out of this.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Let me follow up on that, Bob, I may be
a creature of my own generation. When I went to law school, a lot of
what we were taught commonly was the emerging federal writing of
law was a response to discrimination that was embedded in certain
states. And so at least in my callow youth, I always sort of thought
state government was retrogressive, federal government progressive.
To some extent there’s a flip here when you see the tobacco industry
going to get a national warning to try to cut off some of the state
claims.
I was going to ask before your last comment, does this mean that
we’ve seen that the “federal government rides to the rescue” theory
was intrinsically wrong or have we seen any sort of a movement po-
litically or legally? I think what you might be saying is that civil
rights was a case where the power center of the road to the rescue
just happened to be federal because of the other embedded problems
in the states. Or have we seen a movement now where the action in
terms of progressive legal activity is in the states and away from the
federal government?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: The history has always been of a shift in
movement. Sometimes it has been in the states, and sometimes it
has been at the federal level. If you grew up in the 1950s and 1960s
and heard the federal government was perfect and it was a solution
to all your problems, you were misled. And what we’re seeing today is
the degree to which you were misled.
Let me tell you a horror story. Right now the United States Con-
gress is considering legislation to preempt all state fraud claims, all
state fraud claims, because they are interfering with the creation of
capital on Wall Street.
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So, the federal government can be a source of injury and danger to
people who want rights. It is not just the best place to go. We are a
federal system. The founders were right. You split power, and you
divide it out, and people can’t be harmed by too much power. They
can move in other places.
MR. HOGAN: Jeff, I didn’t know about the pending federal fraud
statute, but we do know that there is a pending federal products li-
ability statute.
In other words, the proposal is to make a federal case out of it, to
make the law of products liability a federal law. And you then have
to wonder, those who favor that, what happens in ten years or five
years or whenever the political winds blow differently. The senator
who is favored by the manufacturers is not the chairman of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, which decides what the federal product li-
ability law will be, but instead it is a senator, whatever party it
might be, but let’s say it were a Democratic majority in the Senate
and a senator who favors access to courts and rights to jury trial and
the ability to pursue claims against manufacturers and you have a
liberalized federal standard of strict liability in the field of products
liability.
So when the decision is made to federalize something, it is then
federalized for everybody. Wrong decisions can be made, and the ad-
vocates who wanted it to be federal in the end may not like that at all
and wish that it was being done by the states. So there are particular
dangers with this business of federalizing everything to protect one’s
own interests.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: I don’t mind when they federalize it, I
hate when they federalize it and then preempt everybody else. It’s a
question of truth. There isn’t just one version of it in Washington.
Hopefully there are fifty states that can work out alternative solu-
tions that other people don’t interfere with.
MR. GENTRY: This argument by Bob is the reason why a lot of
people are opposed to the national settlement. There are very legiti-
mate concerns that by passing this national law we are setting a
precedent here. We are limiting the rights of individuals, whether or
not we are basically federalizing individual rights to their detriment.
There are good arguments on that side. I don’t know that you’ve
heard those arguments today because most of the people here at least
on this panel, I think, have been so involved with this issue and be-
lieve that the national health care benefits involved with this terrible
epidemic so far outweigh the relatively slight limitations on individ-
ual claims, which are largely illusory because nobody can win them,
but this is such a unique situation that it does, in fact, justify a na-
tional solution.
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But I’ve got to tell you, you know, I can argue that out of the other
side of my mouth very well. And it makes me very, very nervous, be-
cause I think most of us at this table historically have opposed the
idea of limiting individual rights, certainly on a federal level, and re-
placing individual rights or state rights with a federal system or
compensation system. So it is very problematical and probably would
have been helpful if we had somebody here who can really advocate
the other side of that. Maybe Bob can.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Let me raise this issue, too. In corporate
law they talk about a race to the bottom or some people think it is a
race to the top. Others think it is a race to the bottom in terms of
what you will do to attract business.
Are you going to have some states that settle too cheaply if we
have tobacco litigation on a state-by-state basis and don’t overcome it
with a national agreement, or do you think all states would be ulti-
mately as inspired as Florida was to do a pretty thorough job of
fighting?
MR. FONVIELLE: I think it is a tough question, because I think
we know there are an awful lot of states that have just, so to speak,
jumped on the bandwagon. I think Andy would know better than I
do. I know that the states coming up for trial right now are all very
well prepared to go to trial. But I also know from talking to some
other states that they’ve just filed the lawsuits thinking that they are
going to get an easy settlement. The last thing you would want from
an individual state standpoint is to start trying these cases and los-
ing them.
On the other hand, if we started trying and winning them, I’m
sure it would end up with some sort of resolution on a global basis,
on a national basis in any event. Andy can probably speak to that.
This is something that Andy is dealing with right now with the other
states. You can answer that better than I can.
MR. BERLY: As far as settlement and so forth is concerned, Mis-
sissippi has settled and Florida has settled. There was rationality in
the apportionment of damages separate and apart from just the
models that were going to be presented at trial.
You know, the industry has their figures and there are the na-
tional Medicaid numbers so that you can sort of graph out what the
gross Medicaid dollars are, and then look and say what Florida’s pro-
portion of that is, what Mississippi’s proportion of that is, what say,
for example, Oklahoma’s would be. So if the national settlement, for
example, does get bogged down somehow, and there are some of
these cases that come up for trial, there should be a logical way,
should the industry be inclined to settle these cases, of using a
mathematical formula for determining what their pro rata amount of
the Medicaid dollars would be.
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Certainly the best overall resolution would be a global national
deal that wraps everything in there together and gets all the public
health benefits, because some states and some governors and AGs
may not be as public-policy oriented as Governor Chiles and General
Butterworth were who held out for some major concessions by the
industry concerning advertising and so forth. It may be that some
other states would really just try to get the Medicaid dollars back,
but that remains to be seen.
DEAN LeBEL: I moved here in July from the state of Virginia,
which amended its Medicaid recovery act in the 1996 legislative ses-
sion to require that the state be subjected to all of the affirmative de-
fenses that would have helped in an action by the smoker. That
state’s Attorney General is going to be the next governor, and it is a
very different political climate for tobacco. The politics of this are in-
teresting. I would like to echo what Bob was saying about the impor-
tance of multiple centers of power. It is important not to leave the
public out of this as a power center.
Three states, with very different political characters, California,
Arizona, and Massachusetts, by referendum raised the tax on tobacco
products, with those funds earmarked for a number of public health
programs; not just repaying the state for some of the health care
costs, but also financing smoker cessation programs, smoking pre-
vention programs in the schools.
To think that the political live wire, the live third rail of a tax in-
crease would be brought about in those states through voter actions
or referendum rather than through what might have been seen fool-
hardy legislative action by people who were going to lose their seats
almost immediately, I think is encouraging.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: With regard to that, let me raise this is-
sue. President Clinton, David Kessler, C. Everett Koop, and others
have criticized the national settlement. And we’ve talked about it as
a received thing. What about the criticisms that it is too easy on the
tobacco industry? Once Professor Blakey made one of his rare mis-
takes and talked about all profits worldwide for time immemorial, it
makes the price tag look pretty huge.
Did people look at a lot of money and grab the brass ring too
quickly, or is the national settlement fair? There seems to have been
a lot of criticism of it since July, that it has been tilted too much to-
ward the tobacco industry.
DEAN LeBEL: There is one point that I think is important to
make about the settlement. We’ve used the term “global settlement”
a number of times. I used it this morning in my introductory re-
marks.
This is not a global settlement. It is a global settlement only in the
sense that the World Series is the “World” Series. There is a very un-
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fortunate response on the part of the American industry, multina-
tional industry now, to the advances that are being made and the
protection of consumers in this country through products liability
litigation and legislation. That is to export the harmful products and
to increase dramatically the harm that has been caused in other
parts of the globe.
We just need to be careful as we pat ourselves on the back for
what we’ve accomplished for our citizens. We need to be careful we
don’t lose sight of the significant harm that is being inflicted on the
rest of the world.
MR. FONVIELLE: Jeff, along the lines of the national settlement,
what we saw from Washington and Congress right after the national
settlement was a sudden change of sentiment or feeling by the public
that, “Gee whiz, anybody can beat tobacco.”
Really. I got calls from Congressmen. They are saying, “Hey, you
know, what’s going on? You know, why are y’all still suing in Florida?
Tobacco, anybody can beat tobacco. They will roll over.”
Whether or not the national settlement dollars are right, you need
to take that in light of the fact that there has got to be some give and
take on both sides. There is no way in the courtroom that we could
ever get the relief that has been offered and held out there like a car-
rot on the end of the string, the end of the stick. We could never get
in the courtroom a lot of what’s been offered in the national settle-
ment and an opportunity to get rid of the real problem, such as ad-
vertising.
We may go in the courtroom and win some against tobacco, but
they are just going to gear up their advertising campaign and go back
out there and try harder to sell more cigarettes. The national settle-
ment, as much as I am for individual rights, in light of the reality of
the approach to litigating with tobacco, I think is a fair settlement.
MR. HOGAN: One of the other criticisms that is out there related
to the national settlement is not something that I understand per-
fectly well, but it has to do with what is perceived as a type of restric-
tion on the FDA’s regulatory power. It is not what you would expect
would happen there, but is a reversal of some of the procedural re-
quirements.
My guess is that particular thing, which is of concern—I think the
President said that was one of his major concerns—is something that
would be improved as Attorney General Butterworth was saying as
legislation goes to the Congress.
The last thing you would want to do I think is come out of this
change and all of this litigation producing an overall good public
health result, by having something that would weaken the ability of
the regulatory agency to address this drug. So my guess is that’s a
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criticism that would be seen as a valid criticism, and changes would
be likely to be made.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: But relatively independent of the dol-
lars and extracting other concessions.
MR. GENTRY: I think with Surgeon General Koop, the major
criticism has been the concern that the FDA’s authority that is de-
sired would be weakened. That’s my understanding of the major
criticism.
As Wayne said, hopefully that would be resolved in Congress. I
don’t know that the public in general understands or maybe many
lawyers, that one of the reasons why the global, so-called global, set-
tlement was done is that there are tremendous, as you might guess,
First Amendment issues involved here.
And as David said, we simply could not make them take down the
billboards. We simply could not control their advertising through the
legal system. There is only so much that can be done. And I think
there is only so much that Congress can do unless especially what
amounts to a consent decree. Basically what the industry is doing is
they are willing to give up certain rights that they would have even
in the face of federal legislation. There are certain other things that
can occur.
The belief is that by putting this multifaceted approach in, within
the next ten or fifteen years it will largely eradicate smoking as the
health epidemic that it is. And so that makes it worthwhile.
The overseas problem, are they going overseas? Yes. Do many
overseas countries actually participate in selling cigarettes? Yes. Is it
considered to be a boon in some countries? Absolutely. In the Wall
Street Journal they reported that it was a great thing. Many coun-
tries actually participate in the sale of it, so they make profit at a re-
tail level. They tax it. And it kills people about the age of sixty before
they become unproductive. It is a three-way benefit to some coun-
tries, and honestly people have made that sort of financial analysis
in Third World countries and in Eastern Europe.
So cigarettes are going to be around. The question is what can we
do here in the United States to try to save the health of our people. I
think that’s the way most of us looked at it.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: In your assessment is overseas tobacco
marketing not necessarily to dump your tobacco stock because of the
overseas market? Will there really be a substantial reduction in this
country as a result of these activities?
MR. HOGAN: The hope would be—we lead the world in a whole
range of other things—and the hope would be that we would lead the
world in causing others to see that there is an importance to adopt-
ing approaches to public health and approaches to the legal system
the way the United States has done.
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It is a strange thing when our civil justice system is criticized, and
yet you see the important benefits that it can bring. If you brought in
other countries you would have no right to do anything about this
kind of tremendous carnage that is intentionally created.
So you really would like to think that others would model on what
we’ve done right. This approach would spread and hope to save some
lives across the seas.
MR. GENTRY: There can be a safer cigarette, which we never ad-
dressed in the symposium, and it is a big part of what Andy discov-
ered. There could be and there could have been for the last three dec-
ades a much safer cigarette. They intentionally withheld it from the
market rather than acknowledging the fact they had been killing
people previously. And if nothing else comes out of this, maybe they
will come out of the closet with a safer cigarette, because there can be
a safer cigarette.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: We’re now in the wake of the settle-
ment. The talk has been in some quarters, “Let’s repeal that portion
of the Medicaid Reimbursement Act now that tobacco has been even-
tually slain or dealt a mortal wound.”
What do the panelists think about that? Have we just heard a
consensus seeming to emerge that this was the type of product for
which this sort of action would work and that there aren’t others out
there? Do you favor retaining the statute in its present form or re-
pealing it so that Associated Industries and others can sleep peace-
fully at night knowing it is no longer on the books?
MR. HOGAN: The Governor told us this morning that he offered
to limit the statute in its application to cigarettes, and that was re-
jected by Associated Industries, which wanted to keep the sword, the
imaginary sword hanging over its members. It didn’t want to protect
them. So apparently that was a false issue out there.
My guess would be that Governor Chiles had the political acumen
and judgment to know whether he needed this statute on the books
or not, and for my part, I would follow his judgment on the question
of when and if this statute should be changed.
MR. GENTRY: For goodness sakes don’t take it away from us un-
til after we know whether or not we have to go back to court, which is
what they really want to do. We may still need it.
MR. HOGAN: We have a September 1998 trial date. The judge
has retained jurisdiction over this industry. We know that this in-
dustry is capable of a lot things. It is maneuvering in the Congress
even as we speak. So things are better left alone for now.
PROFESSOR GARVIN: Even if the settlement ultimately goes
through to everyone’s satisfaction or at least to everyone’s even dis-
content, which is just as good, I think, there is something that might
be rather nice about keeping it around, which is a couple of aspects of
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it having to do with, for example, the liberal construction of the rules
of evidence due to statistical proof, the market share approaches that
represent the more progressive trend of tort law.
One thing that I found particularly interesting about this statute
is that it states nothing revolutionary, but just what is perhaps the
better opinions in tort law, especially against what seems to be a ret-
rograde move. If you look at something like the Restatement (Third)
of Products Liability, which to editorialize briefly, is an unmitigated
disaster.
When you look at some more changes impending I think in the
law of warranties, having a legislative recognition is, something that
I think is more properly called “tort reform” than the things that are
typically called tort reform by legislators nowadays. Tort “deform”
would be perhaps closer to the truth. I think it is something that is
worth pursuing perhaps more generally at some point as the pres-
sures on the economy tend to push it further toward the defense side,
as well as they have legislative recognition.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Let me follow up on that just for a sec-
ond. What do you consider to be the pressures that are pushing the
common law of tort toward more of a defense perspective? This case
seems to run counter to that, but this case is also a unique public-
private partnership, if you will.
PROFESSOR GARVIN: Well, there are the things that actually
deal with problems, and the things that are advertised as doing so, I
think, which may be distinctions.
I suppose the thing that is normally advertised is a problem of the
so-called punitive damages problem as you see in tort reform statutes
in the states. I think that’s one of the major focal points, an attempt
to limit the availability of punitive damages. But a good deal of the
changes you see is an attempt, in large part I think, to turn back
some of the moves as in the 1960s that advanced strict liability for
product defect. It is not surprising that defendants perhaps see op-
portunities as the common law is remade and restated, and this is a
particularly ripe time for doing it, with the Restatements and the
Uniform Commercial Code being revised. This is the time when the
common law and relevant standards can be shifted greatly.
It is not surprising you mentioned public choice or interest group
activity before. This is a time for lobbying. This is a time for fierce
advocacy.
MR. HOGAN: The one thing that is worrisome about that move
that you detected out there is that a move away from consumer pro-
tection in the law is happening at the same time that we come off a
good number of years of regulatory change, where the consumer pro-
tection capability of agencies has been reduced, either by reduced
staffing or reduced regulations.
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One would think that you should have one or the other, or at least
a good solid mix of both. But if you take away regulatory controls,
and at the same time you take away free enterprise controls from the
standpoint of civil justice, or a remedy for wrong, you leave little im-
petus except the criminal law, I suppose.
I don’t think we want to be in a position where we turn every in-
dustry into the object of criminal sanction and have to go to that
level. There ought to be the ability to have appropriate civil liability
for wrongdoing and something that is known as monetary damages
and punitive damages for egregious wrongdoing. So it is alarming
that you would have both aspects, both regulatory and the civil jus-
tice system in retrograde to the detriment of consumers.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Paul LeBel. Products liability, you have
devoted a good part of your career to that. Do you agree with that as-
sessment?
DEAN LeBEL: Absolutely, I’m on the consultative group for the
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability, and it’s more dreadful
than has been described. It is more retrograde than the current ver-
sions of the federal products liability legislation.
The good news I suppose is that it is less likely to enjoy the sub-
stantial support that the Second Restatement had because it is so out
of whack.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Is it your sense, too, that the courts
perceive that this was a Restatement like, unfortunately, many of
the ALI products of the last decade, that have been subject to pretty
heavy lobbying from interest groups, that it’s less of a pure intellec-
tual analysis of the situation?
DEAN LeBEL: I was elected to the American Law Institute after
the work on corporate governance had concluded, but what I was told
by members was that that was the first instance of the politicaliza-
tion of ALI projects. It was certainly true of the products liability Re-
statement. In fact, the selection of the reporters for that project was
itself a political statement on the part of the ALI and foreshadowed
what the end product was going to be.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Andy Berly, what does a firm with a na-
tional tort practice do in this environment? Are the days as dark as
suggested? Are there other lurking tobacco litigations out there that
you see in the offing, or when everything works through Texas and
works through the system in the national settlement, is this the last
we are going to see of this sort of litigation?
MR. BERLY: I don’t really know. I have been so buried in the to-
bacco litigation for the last three years. Truly all I have seen is the
tobacco litigation from a view of the trenches. I don’t get involved
much in the politics, the legislative end of things. I truly just don’t
know.
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Judge H. Lee Sarokin in the Haines case, started out talking
about in the days and age of breast implants and Dalkon shields,
when it is going to end, when are big businesses going to pay atten-
tion to the consumer, when are they going to put people ahead of
profits. If history is any indication, there are going to be companies,
there are going to be industries that continue to conduct business
like this. And hopefully there will be laws around to provide some re-
dress.
One of my favorite Tobacco Institute documents is one of their
presidents or chairmen, I forget which, giving a speech. He is la-
menting the reformulation of Congress. I forget what year it is. And
he says, “We are going to have a tough row to hoe in this coming year
because Congress has become much more consumer oriented, which
is very bad news for us.” This struck me as horribly ironic because
they sell a consumer product. There they are lamenting the fact that
they are going to have a legislature to contend with that is pro con-
sumer.
I mean if that doesn’t say it, I don’t know what does.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Bob Blakey, let me ask you. The RICO
statute, it must be like watching your child grow to adolescence and
be adjudicated a delinquent in the popular press. I can remember
reading articles and articles in the 1980s and ‘90s about how “garden
variety” business wrongs were being turned into RICO claims, and
wasn’t this an outrage, that no streets were safe for the average
American CEO, and that life is crumbling in western civilization—all
because of RICO.
After what appears to be the critical role by consensus, we’ve
agreed that the RICO claim has had in bringing about this most im-
pressive result, is there potentially new life in RICO claims?
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: There are two RICOs. There is a criminal
RICO that I think is virtually untouchable. It is a general consensus
in the federal judiciary and the federal prosecutors and in the Con-
gress that it has been effective against the Mafia, drug groups, politi-
cal corruption, and it is just beyond being touched. The civil side of
RICO is, and has been, in serious trouble. The so-called securities re-
form—Professor Garvin said tort reform or deform—I like to think of
securities chloroform legislation that went through in 1995. The hu-
bris and all of the scandals on Wall Street, Michael Milkin and eve-
rything, that should normally have led to reform legislation, actually
led to cutting back rights of people to sue. And it took securities
fraud out as a civil predicate for RICO.
And I will tell you that the federal courts using enormous care not
to touch the criminal side have virtually made it impossible in cer-
tain geographic circuits to bring civil RICO cases now. If you look at
the statistics on it, they are declining slowly. My estimate is that the
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tobacco industry has suffered such a blow because of civil RICO in
this, that you will see in some of the states efforts to repeal civil
RICO.
For example, in Delaware. Now why would they choose Delaware?
In Delaware, as a result of new litigation, no civil RICO case can be
brought until there has been a criminal conviction on the underlying
predicate act. So none are brought.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: So, in Delaware, the Sedima34 case got
codified. The Second Circuit Sedima case got codified.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY: For much the same reason that the com-
mon law defenses were put on third-party medical actions in Vir-
ginia.
While I said previously that people ought not to be cynical, that
law is not politics, I probably should have said it is not always poli-
tics. There is hope for us, and there is ample room for us to think
that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and if we don’t watch
these things and fight for them, the war is never won. There are only
battles in the RICO reform to do the right thing.
PROFESSOR STEMPEL: Those seem almost like closing re-
marks, Bob. And without truncating anybody else’s rights of free
speech here at the panel, I think I might use that opportunity to
bring the program to a close, although I want to thank all of our
guest speakers and participants.
I want to thank Mark Evans back in the booth and Kevin Davis
and Diana Patterson and Frank Bowden and the people who have
worked so hard on the technical aspects of this program. In particu-
lar I want to thank our guests, Bob Blakey from Notre Dame, W.C.
Gentry and Wayne Hogan from Jacksonville, Dean Paul LeBel, Pro-
fessor Larry Garvin, and Andy Berly all the way from Charleston.
I want to reserve for a moment a special word of thanks for David
Fonvielle. The old adage is that there is no limit to what can be done
if no one cares who gets the credit. David has absolutely personified
that in putting together this program. It is through his great efforts
and great rapport with a number of the speakers whom we’ve heard
from today that we were able to bring together this group of people
today, including the Governor and the Attorney General.
And as is his way, David has been very happy to let other people
bask in the limelight. He deserves a very special thanks on our part
here at FSU for the program. With that we will conclude our sympo-
sium.
                                                                                                                   
34. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 479
(1985). The Second Circuit in Sedima had required that there be a conviction on an un-
derlying predicate act before a civil RICO claim could be made, the standard now applied
in the Delaware RICO Act according to Professor Blakey. In the Supreme Court’s Sedima
decision, the court rejected this “prior conviction” requirement.  See id. at 488.
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